Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation

Sabine A. Döring

ABSTRACT

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief-desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal (conceptual) connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief-desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly.

1. Internalism

According to internalism, normative practical reasons, being of their essence designed to rationalise and justify actions, must be shown to be at least potentially explanatory of action. A normative practical reason must be something for which it is possible to act, and in any case where an agent does act for the reason, it must also explain his action. This is to say that a normative practical reason must at the same time be a motivating reason. A normative practical reason must have motivational force, as, if it lacked motivational force, we would always need some motive external to the reason itself in order to explain an action. Internalism, as understood here, denies that someone can judge, and possibly know, that it is right for him to perform a certain action in the given circumstances whilst being entirely unmotivated to perform that action. This does not exclude that the motives supplied by reason may be defeated by rival ones. Stating that a normative practical

† Philosophy, The University of Manchester, School of Social Sciences, Dover Street Building, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK; Email: mail@sabinedoering.de
reason must at the same time be a motivating one is equivalent to the claim that the reason must be potentially explanatory of action. An agent can thus have a normative practical reason, which is at the same time a motivating reason, without that reason’s being overriding.¹

Internalism is a conceptual requirement. On an internalist account, it is part of the concept of a normative reason for action that it can also be the motive for which an action is done, and that is: that it can also explain an action. What makes a normative reason practical then is precisely that it can be both the reason why an action is right and the reason why it is done. To accept internalism means to expect a psychological theory of motivation and explanation of action from the theory of practical reason: until it has been shown that we can be motivated by normative practical reasons, their validity has not been established.²

Internalism is common ground to contemporary theorising about practical reasoning. For reasons that have already been pointed out by Kant, it is also defended in this paper. First, however, it must be clarified that, by arguing for internalism about motivation, I assume internalism about reasons or rationalism.³ Rationalism states that if it is right for an agent to choose a certain action in a given situation, or if he ought to choose that action in the given situation, there necessarily is a normative reason for him to choose that action in the given situation (cf. also Smith 1994, 60 ff.). Following Wilfrid Sellars, rationalism may be characterised as a ‘material inference’, i.e. as an inference that we are entitled to draw thanks to the concepts of rights or ought. Endorsing rationalism is part

---

¹ This corresponds to Michael Smith’s (1987, 37–41; 1994, ch. 4.2) characterisation of a motivating reason. It is also in accord with John Broome’s interpretation of what Christine Korsgaard (1986) calls the ‘internalism requirement’: ‘It is implausible that people necessarily do what they believe they ought to do . . . But for reason to be practical, it must be possible for people to do what they believe they ought to do because they believe they ought to do it’ (Broome 1997, 139).

² This does not commit the internalist to a causal theory of motivation and explanation of action. As Michael Smith (1987, 43–5; 1994, ch. 4) points out, reason explanations are teleological explanations in the first place, and it is a second and independent question whether teleological explanations are a species of causal explanations. Internalism implies an empirical demand on theories of practical reason only for those who embrace a causal theory of motivation and explanation of action. For if, first, normative practical reasons are capable of explaining actions, and if, secondly, explanations of actions are a species of causal explanations, some theory is required on how normative practical reasons can figure in causal explanations, and that theory must be in accord with our best scientific theories. The locus classicus for a causal conception of internalist reason explanations is Donald Davidson’s essay Actions, Reasons and Causes. Here (1963, 8ff.) Davidson claims that in any case where an agent performed an action because he had a reason for it, the reason for his action must also be its cause. By contrast, Jonathan Dancy’s (1995) account provides an example of a conjunction of internalism and a noncausal theory of motivation.

³ To the best of my knowledge this distinction was first introduced by David Brink (1989, ch. 3).
of the grasp of these concepts, for they imply that there is a reason (in the normative sense) to do what is right, or what one ought to do. Accordingly, whenever we judge that it is right to choose a certain action, or that we ought to choose it, the conceptual content of our judgement gives us a reason for action. Only under the assumption of rationalism, i.e. under the assumption that there are such things as reasons for action, are we faced with the problem of rational motivation.

For the present, my only concern is with an agent’s ‘subjective’ reasons for action. By these I mean (the contents of) those judgements or beliefs that the agent himself takes to rationalise certain actions. Subjective reasons for action can, but need not, be objective as well, whatever objective reasons for action may be. I shall abstain here from giving a specific account of what objective reasons for action are, so as to avoid complications that may arise from any such account (as, for example, from the claim that reasons are facts). It will suffice to tackle the problem of rational motivation in general, especially so as internalism concerns subjective reasons for action no less than objective ones. Both kinds of reasons are normative. Accordingly, internalism requires both kinds of reasons to be at the same time motivating reasons. The point at issue is to explicate how, in a rational agent, the normative reason explains the act.

Some might object that subjective reasons for action are not normative in the ‘standard sense’ (cf. Scanlon 1998, 18; cf. also Parfit 1997). Yet subjective reasons must not be misconceived as being simply tantamount to motivating reasons. There is a sense in which subjective reasons are normative. If an agent acts on a belief that does not qualify as knowledge and hence does not provide him with an objective reason, his motivation and action may still count as rational as, from his subjective perspective, he does the right thing. From his point of view, there is a normative reason for doing what he does, and he would clearly make a mistake if he failed to act in accord with his belief. Strictly speaking, judgements of practical rationality are relative to the agent’s beliefs (cf. Korsgaard 1986, 11 f.; cf. also Davidson 1969, 21). Thus, if someone jumps into the canal because he believes that his hotel is on fire, and that, under these circumstances, jumping into the canal is the right thing to do, it is practically rational for him to jump. It might not be true that the hotel is on fire, and there might not be sufficient evidence for the truth of this proposition. Jumping into the canal might also not be the appropriate action when the hotel is on fire. Still, the agent, if he actually believes he ought to jump, has a normative reason for action in the sense that, from his perspective, the content of this belief rationalises a certain action, namely, to jump into the canal. An agent, then, is practically rational to the extent that he performs the actions that are made rational by the propositions he actually holds true. Whether or not these propositions constitute knowledge: I consider them to constitute the agent’s subjective reasons for action which do not differ from objective
This said, we may now return to internalism (about motivation) and distinguish it from externalism. By contrast with the internalist, the externalist aims at separating the question of whether an action is justified from the problem of rational motivation. According to him, it is possible to judge that one ought to perform a certain action whilst being entirely unmotivated to do so: to judge that a certain action is right is one thing, and to be motivated to perform it another. Hence someone may come to judge, say, that it is wrong to maltreat his wife, without being necessarily moved thereby to refrain from the action. Instead he will need some motive external to his insight that he ought not maltreat his wife, and thus external to his reason for not acting that way. Such a motive could, e.g., be sympathy for his wife. It is the nature of the connection between reason and motivation that is at stake here. While the internalist holds that requirements of reason must be necessarily motivating (as always, they need not be overriding), the externalist denies this necessary (conceptual) connection.

An immediate worry about externalism is the lack of guarantee that the external motive exists whenever it is needed; nor is it guaranteed that its existence always leads to action in conformity with reason. Sympathy for his wife could equally move the husband to assist her in committing a crime. The externalist might reply that cases like that can be excluded by an appropriate upbringing and education: human motives are to be developed in such a way that normative reasons are always accompanied by appropriate external motives (cf., e.g. Mill 1863, 34 ff.; Scanlon 1982).

It remains open, however, why we should be motivated to develop our motives in the required way. Claiming that it is a requirement of reason to do so would be pointless as the motivational force of the supposed requirement depends on the required motive itself (cf. Kant 1797, 399; cf. also Scanlon 1998, 6 ff., in contrast to Scanlon 1982). Furthermore, even if the co-occurrence of rational requirements and appropriate external motives could be guaranteed somehow, this would not invalidate the following objection: Any adequate conception of rational agency must account for the phenomenon of rational guidance, the fact that in cases in which we succeed in complying with our judgements about what is right our behaviour is controlled by reason (cf. Wallace 1999). The externalist is unable to make sense of rational guidance. If normative reasons were not necessarily motivating, the co-occurrence of a normative reason and an appropriate motive would

---

I shall also abstain here from specifying different categories of normative reasons and their relation to each other. In particular, I shall treat moral reasons as a subclass of normative practical reasons in general so that the motives they supply may succumb to other rational motives (as, for instance, to motives of self-interest or prudence) as well as to arational motives (like fits of meaningless violence or hysterics).
be a mere coincidence. An action springing from such a co-occurrence would never be done for the reason, and this means that it would never be done because it is right. If the husband stops maltreating his wife because he feels sympathy for her, he happens to do what is right, but it is not reason which guides him. He could be completely indifferent to the requirements of reason. This is why Kant (1785, 397 ff.) excludes actions like this one from the class of morally valuable actions. As he puts it, such actions are merely dutiful, i.e. in conformity with the requirements of reason, but the agent does not act from the motive of duty, i.e. because reason requires him to act that way (cf. also Herman 1993a). If externalism were true, human motivation and action could never be rational in the sense of being guided by reason.

2. The internalist dilemma

Pace Kant, internalism need not amount to the claim that reason is capable by itself of supplying motives for action. On the contrary, Humeans combine it with the further premise that all motivational explanation must start from the ‘desires’ (or ‘pro-attitudes’) an agent happens to have. Opposing the Kantian thesis that an agent’s judgements and knowledge cannot only justify his actions, but also motivate him to act accordingly, the Humean insists that an agent’s desires are the only states of motivational significance. Given this account of motivation in combination with the requirement that in any case where an agent does act for it, a normative practical reason must also explain the action, it follows that all practical reasons must somehow be reached by deliberation from an agent’s actual desires (cf. Williams 1981; 1995). In the classical, namely, the instrumental case, this means that an agent has a reason for acting because he desires a certain thing and believes a certain action to be a suitable means for attaining that thing.5

The crucial question is whether this account does succeed in meeting the internalism requirement. Remember that the task is to explicate how a normative reason can explain an action, where the reason is provided by a belief of the content that it is right to choose a certain action, or that one ought to choose that action. No such belief plays a part in the Humean explication. Instead we are left with a desire for something together with the belief that a certain action is a

5 Bernard Williams formulates the Humean conclusion (and challenge) as follows: all reasons for action must be ‘internal’ reasons. This has complicated the debate as, under his influence, many writers use the term ‘internalism’ to designate the Humean account of practical reason. Confusion further increases when we look at other philosophical disciplines than the theory of practical reason (such as, e.g., epistemology), for the term ‘internalism’ has been given so many divergent interpretations. To avoid ambiguities, I shall use ‘internalism’ exclusively to refer to the motivational requirement on normative practical reasons as it has been introduced in the last section.
suitable means to get this thing. It is questionable, therefore, whether the Humean does account for reasons in the normative sense.

The number of thinkers who argue that he doesn’t is legion. Their arguments vary, but the basic approach common to many of them is to attack the Humean conception of ‘desire’ (cf., e.g. Nagel 1970; Quinn 1993; Velleman 1992; Korsgaard 1997; Hampton 1998). So what does the term ‘desire’ refer to here? According to the contemporary Humean theory of motivation (cf. Smith 1987; 1994, ch. 4), desires are propositional attitudes characterised by their ‘goal-directedness’ or ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’, in contrast to the ‘mind-to-world direction of fit’ characteristic of belief. As opposed to beliefs which are held to aim at truth, i.e. at fitting the world, it is claimed of desires that they aim at bringing about ‘goals’, and that is, conversely, at changing the world in such a way that it fits the desire. By virtue of their characteristic direction of fit or goal-directedness (rather than truth-directedness), desires are considered to be indispensable to the explanation of action whereas beliefs are regarded as incapable of motivating: it is the desire, and not the belief, that provides an end for action. The desires agents have are claimed to dispose them to act in such way that their goal is achieved, where the desired goal constitutes the end to which the action is intended as a means.

If this is meant to say that desires are merely functional states that do not involve an evaluation of the desired goal as good, they might explain actions, but would not qualify as reasons in the normative sense. Here we may consider Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1957, §§ 37 ff.) example of someone who claims to desire a saucer of mud, or Warren Quinn’s (1993, 236 ff.) example of a man who feels an urge to turn on every radio he sees. It is not that these persons see anything good about the goals their respective desires are directed at. They do not have anything to say concerning the question of what is good about having a saucer of mud or about turning radios on or radios being turned on, respectively. They do not attach any value to either the action or its outcome, be it a mud bath, music, news or the avoidance of silence. They simply are disposed to have a saucer of mud and to turn on any radio that is seen to be off, respectively. While Anscombe argues that, in examples like these, it makes no sense to ascribe desires to agents at all, Quinn carefully distinguishes between the explanation and the rationalisation of an action by reference to desire. From his example of the person with a strange functional state disposing him to turn on radios Quinn neither concludes that the person actually lacks a desire, nor that ‘desires’ in this sense may not have some significant role to play in the explanation of action. His point rather is that desires, as they are conceptualised by the Humean, fail to rationalise actions. To be rational, the man in Quinn’s example must see something good about turning radios on or see something good about radios being turned on, and that is: he must evaluate the goal his desire is directed at as good. Thus, to be capable of rationalising actions, a desire is to be analysed as having a ‘world-to-mind
direction of fit’ in the evaluative sense that its regarding of a goal as to be brought about is to regard that goal as good. Furthermore, the evaluation must somehow imply the normative judgement that this good ought to be brought about by the agent. For the sake of the argument, I shall here assume that there is such an implication, but I shall return to this issue below (cf. section 5 of this paper).

If the Humean conceded this, the Kantian could gloat over his bankruptcy. If desires were involving normative judgements held true by the agent, his having a reason for acting would no longer depend on whether he believes that the action is a suitable means for fulfilling some of his arational desires. Instead, he would have a reason for acting because he judges, and possibly knows, that he ought to bring about the good which he expects to be brought about by the action. The Humean would find himself in a Kantian framework in the end.

On the other hand, it is by no means clear how the Kantian could meet the Humean challenge, i.e., account not only for the rationalisation but also for the explanation of action. It is exactly the Humean’s point against the Kantian that an agent’s judgements cannot by themselves motivate any action, so that the Kantian theory of practical reason is psychologically inappropriate. As the Humean puts it, an account of practical reason which ultimately eliminates desire must necessarily fail, as it is unable to explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious: if, to be motivated to perform a certain action, it does not suffice to judge that either the action itself or its expected outcome ought to be brought about, i.e., if demands that pure reason is supposed to make on us can in fact never motivate us, it is pointless to insist on the validity of such demands.

At this point we are faced with a dilemma. With both the Humean and the Kantian view of practical reason normative and motivating reasons come to be seen as mutually exclusive. While the Humean cannot account for the normativity of practical reasons but commits himself to the incoherent claim that arational desires are capable of rationalising actions, the Kantian fails for the opposite reason. Though the latter rightly points out that only states with a certain kind of content can enter into practical reasoning, he clings to the psychologically dubious postulate that pure reason has motivational force. As what I have called the ‘Humean’ versus the ‘Kantian’ view of practical reason corresponds to the two ways in which the belief-desire model of the explanation and rationalisation of action can be instantiated, this ‘internalist dilemma’ implies that rational motivation cannot satisfactorily be described in terms of that model.

As a last resort, it has become increasingly popular in recent theories of practical reason to introduce a meta-desire to rationality (cf., in detail, Wallace 1999, 227 ff.). The latter is said to differ from ordinary Humean desires in not being focussed on concrete goals (such as a saucer of mud) that are directly relevant to action. Instead, this meta-desire is understood as an abstract disposition, subjection to which is claimed to be constitutive of our being rational or,
alternatively, of our being agents. Examples are Michael Smith’s (1994, ch. 5) disposition to coherence in our attitudes, John Broome’s (1997, 142 ff.) ‘natural disposition’ to do what one believes one ought to do, or David J. Velleman’s (2000, 141 ff.) desire to act in accordance with reasons. Although they may assume various forms, theories involving a meta-desire to rationality may be generally characterised as trying to find a path between Scylla and Charybdis: what I am calling the ‘internalist dilemma’ is meant to be solved by combining a Humean theory of motivation with a Non-Humean, possibly Kantian, theory of normative practical reasons. The meta-desire’s function is to explain the motivational force of rational requirements whilst leaving their status as rational requirements intact. Thus, an agent who judges that he ought to perform a certain action is claimed to be motivated to comply with his normative judgement thanks to his disposition to do what he believes he ought to do, or to act in accordance with reasons.

In spite of the elegance of this approach, the question arises again: What are meta-desires, and can they in fact rationalise actions? According to the currently predominating interpretation, the meta-desire to rationality resembles ordinary Humean desires in being a merely functional state. Just as with ordinary Humean desires, this interpretation fails to equip the meta-desire with rationalising force. As Jay R. Wallace (1999, 235) puts it, there is nothing that would differentiate the meta-desire to rationality from, say, a disease to which human beings are susceptible. If this is so, the meta-desire’s role is merely that of a ‘blind instigator’ (blinder Antreiber), to borrow Robert Musil’s evocative phrase (1938, 1193). Instead of acting on it, it would be equally rational for the agent to take a drug that releases him from his desire (or disease) to rationality. For if, ultimately, he acts on his judgement about what he ought to do because of his subjection to some merely functional disposition he happens to have, the ‘because’ may indicate an explanation but not a rationalisation of his action. The latter possibility depends upon the disposition’s having an intentional content of a certain kind, like the proposition that it is good to do what one believes one ought to do, and that one ought to bring this good about. Only then can the abstract disposition, by entering an inferential relation with a normative judgement that is focussed on a particular action (such as the judgement that one ought to turn on every radio one sees), rationalise an action. In other words, to be capable of rationalising rather than merely explaining actions, the meta-desire to rationality must itself imply a normative judgement.

We must distinguish here between rationalising relations between the contents of mental states, such as inferential relations, and explanatory relations between mental states as mental states (or events), such as causal relations. The rationalisation of an action might be a special case of an explanatory relation. Yet to show this would require an explanation that somehow accounts for the rationalisation,
and I do not see that this is achieved by introducing a merely functional meta-desire to rationality.

We then arrive at the internalist dilemma again. If it is conceded that, in order to be capable of rationalising actions, the meta-desire to rationality must involve a normative judgement, nothing is gained to meet the Humean challenge and to show how reason can have motivational force. On the other hand, if the meta-desire to rationality is given a Humean (functional) interpretation, the corresponding theory of practical reasons cannot establish their normativity. And this is not all. On my view, introducing a merely functional meta-desire to rationality amounts to a relapse into externalism. As pointed out above, internalism is meant to allow for the possibility that human action can be rational in the sense of being guided by reason. If it is to deserve its name, rational guidance requires that, in cases in which we succeed in complying with our judgements about what is right, our behaviour is guided by those judgements in the sense that it is determined by the quality of their content: we do what we do because we hold certain propositions true. This is not the interpretation given by theorists who rely on a merely functional meta-desire to rationality. Under the functional interpretation, the motivational force of rational requirements would entirely depend on whether and to what extent an agent happens to have this desire. An agent who lacked it could remain completely unmoved by his normative judgement, no matter whether he considers its content to be true, and it would make no sense to tell him that reason requires him to comply with his judgement, because the motivational force of this requirement would again depend on his having the meta-desire to rationality. Under the functional interpretation, the motivational force of his normative beliefs would still not be determined by reason, but be simply proportional to that desire’s strength. To exclude this hydraulic interpretation of human motivational psychology, and thus to establish rational guidance in the genuine sense, internalism, as I understand it, requires that normative judgements are necessarily motivating by virtue of their content: because they contain concepts like rightness or ought, such judgements necessarily imply normative reasons for action which, in their turn, must be necessarily motivating.

Following on from this, I shall now argue that there is no need to resort to mental states of a meta-level. The internalist dilemma can be resolved by

6 It is worth emphasising that Scanlon now rejects his original view of rational and, in particular, of moral motivation precisely on such grounds. In his 1982 essay *Contractualism and Utilitarianism* Scanlon characterised the source of moral motivation, which is directly triggered by a normative judgement, as the abstract desire ‘to be able to justify one actions to others on grounds which they could not reasonably reject’ (116). Now he admits that this strategy proved untenable because he found himself unable to explain why ‘a person who lacked this desire would have any reason to avoid acting wrongly’, and to explain how he ‘would account for the fact that lacking this desire is particularly serious fault’ (Scanlon 1998, 7). We thus have here at least one ‘meta-desire-theorist’ who regards his own (former) theory as externalist.
integrating emotion into the theory of practical reason. As will become clear, the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation and rationalisation of action, i.e. they are not judgements or beliefs, nor desires, nor are they simply combinations of both.

3. The emotions: phenomenology and intentionality

The following characterisation of an emotion will prove useful: an emotion is an occurrent conscious state, with a certain feeling or affect, and with a certain kind of intentional content. One could question both the consciousness and the intentionality of emotion. Yet I do not claim to account for every state that is called an ‘emotion’ in ordinary language, nor do I mean to cover every state that was ever called so in the history of philosophy. First of all, it is not a requirement for solving the internalist dilemma that I should attempt such a thing. Apart from this, it may not be a requirement in any case: an analysis of the concepts which underlie our ordinary terms for emotions may qualify these terms and, if necessary, at least partly revise them. It suffices if the analysis works for the paradigm cases of human emotions and can, on that basis, integrate or possibly exclude less paradigmatic cases.\(^7\)

Consider Joseph LeDoux’s (1998, 284) example of the fear you experience when you encounter a snake on a woodland path. What does your emotion involve? From LeDoux’s neuroscientific, third-person perspective, the main ingredients are certain physiological reactions of yours, which typically occur when the visual representation of a snake triggers your amygdala. By contrast, I take it to be constitutive of your emotion that you feel fear of the snake, and that your fear represents the snake as being a certain way to you, say, as being dangerous. Because this is not a neutral representation of how things are, but an evaluation in light of your concerns, such as your concern to escape unharmed, your fear also has motivational force. This is not to say that your fear is linked with one action in particular, fleeing, say; nor does it exclude the possibility that you are paralysed with fear. I shall return below to the question of whether emotions are by their very nature motivational states, as many have claimed or assumed (cf., e.g. Frijda 1986). Let me first explain why I am not referring to the set of physiological reactions, which according to LeDoux make the encounter with the snake a ’full-blown’ emotional reaction of fear.

\(^7\) This in contrast to Amélie Rorty’s (1984) and Paul E. Griffiths’s (1997) views. Both deny that there is such a thing as one single category of the emotions, although for somewhat different reasons. I shall not discuss this point further here. This has already been done by Robert C. Roberts (2003, ch. 1) who presents the most comprehensive defence to date of the coherence of the category ‘emotion’.

© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Editorial Board of dialectica
Of course fear, or any other emotion, is instantiated on a physiological level, and certain causal mechanisms are needed in the first place in order to enable us to experience emotions. But my argument in this paper is about subjective reasons for action, i.e. about what a subject or person believes she ought to do. In accordance with this, I am here dealing with subjective emotions, i.e. with what a person experiences as an emotion. For the present, my only concern is with those so-called emotions which possess a certain phenomenology or subjective quality in our personal or first person experience. As far as I can tell, physiological reactions as studied by LeDoux in his neuroscientific work on conditioned fear in rats do not belong to that kind of experience. Carefully speaking, physiological reactions are not themselves part of our emotional experience. This does neither exclude the experience nor the expression of such reactions: our emotional experience may naturally comprise certain bodily feelings, and these feelings may naturally be expressed.

Let us be clear, though, that Jamesian (1884) bodily feelings are to be distinguished from what I mean by an emotion’s ‘feeling’ or ‘affect’. The latter is best understood in terms of what Peter Goldie (2000, 19 f., and 58 ff.) describes as an ‘(emotional) feeling towards’. While a bodily feeling is the awareness of internal bodily changes (such as muscular reactions, including changes in facial expression, hormonal changes, and changes of the autonomic nervous system), emotional feelings towards are directed at something in the external world. In particular, a feeling towards is insolubly linked with the evaluation that an emotion contains. Emotions are evaluations, but evaluations of a special kind (cf. Alston 1967). On no account can they be reduced to mere evaluations, because an evaluation can be present while the emotion is absent. You and your friend may evaluate a gorilla in a zoo as equally dangerous, and yet you are calm while your friend is gripped with fear. You do not feel fear, as you believe the gorilla to be safely behind bars. (Your belief need not prevent you from feeling fear of the gorilla. This is an important but quite different sort of case, which I shall look at in the next section.) Then you suddenly see that the door to the cage has been left open. Most probably this insight will have an impact on your evaluation. Like your friend, you will now evaluate the gorilla as dangerous in an affective way. I agree with Goldie (2000, 61) that the difference between this new, emotional evaluation and the earlier, calm evaluation is a difference in intentional content. Although both evaluations can be expressed in the same words (‘The gorilla is dangerous’), only the new, emotional evaluation is affective, i.e. contains a certain feeling. The dangerousness of the gorilla now affects you, so to speak, thereby revealing your concern to escape unharmed. The concernfulness of your

---

8 As in the case of reasons, it does not follow that we cannot talk about feelings third-personally (cf. Williams 1978, 295–6).
emotion’s content, to put it in Robert C. Roberts’ (1988 and 2003) terms, manifests itself in its affectiveness, which is not least indicated by the fact that in feeling fear towards the gorilla, typically, you are poised to act in new ways, to act out of your emotion.

In so far as it equips the emotions with an intentional content of a certain kind, the account I am proposing may be characterised as ‘cognitive’. From what I have just said it follows, however, that it does not amount to a ‘judgement theory of emotion’ or a ‘belief-desire theory of emotion’. In particular, it is distinct from any ‘add-on view’ (cf. Goldie 2000, ch. 3).

Add-on views are a species of what I shall call ‘hybrid’- or ‘more-component theories’. Nearly all emotion theories to be found in philosophy today belong to that category. What they all have in common is that they represent a reaction against the strong opposition between (supposedly) new cognitive theories of emotion and traditional noncognitive feeling theories that characterises the beginning of the emotions’ renaissance in contemporary philosophy. At the beginning of the debate the insight that emotions are intentional mental states led to cognitivism in the strict sense that an emotion is defined by a certain value judgement or belief which it necessarily involves (cf., e.g. Kenny 1963; Lyons 1980; Solomon 1993). To count as an instance of fear, for example, a token emotion must involve the judgement that the thing which it is directed at – its intentional object – is fearsome or dangerous. Even when, as in the more sophisticated early theories, the cognitivist does not deny that emotions also involve other factors such as, in particular, certain feelings, these factors are taken to be irrelevant for distinguishing emotion types from each other. This is in clear contrast to the feeling theory that analyses an emotion in terms of its phenomenology alone, i.e. in terms of what it is like to experience the emotion.

By now, the extreme forms of cognitivism and noncognitivism are mostly abandoned in favour of more balanced views. Most philosophers accept that a theory of emotion, although it must not reduce emotion to feeling, has to account for the fact that emotions are by their nature felt states (cf., e.g. Goldie 2000; Nussbaum 2001; Helm 2001; Döring and Peacocke 2002; Roberts 2003). Thus a theory of emotion has to explain both an emotion’s intentionality and its phenomenology. The classical opposition between cognitivism and feeling theory is watered down. As a consequence, theories of emotion now face the challenge to explain how the supposed constituents of an emotion are connected with each other. To show that certain factors, in combination with each other, constitute the emotion itself, the emotion theorist must not treat these factors as mutually independent disjointed components. Instead he must explain how they combine and form a synthesis so that they are necessarily connected with each other and make up the concept of emotion. Clearly such an explanation requires more than pointing to a causal relation, as this would leave the connection entirely contingent.
As their name says, the problem with more-component theories is that they fail to provide the required explanation. They simply define an emotion as an intentional state of a certain kind, typically as a judgement or belief-desire pair, plus $x$, where $x$ may also stand for other factors than a certain feeling, such as certain nonintentional expressions of emotion or certain tendencies to act. Whatever is considered to be a defining factor of an emotion is simply added on to the intentional state in question as a further component of the emotion.

Goldie’s conception of a feeling towards can be seen as a proposal of how to overcome more-component theories. In particular, he is concerned with theories which aim to give as full an account of emotion as can be given without feeling. It is such theories which he labels ‘add-on views’. Typically add-on views are instances of the judgement theory of emotion or the belief-desire theory of emotion. They state that an emotion is a judgement plus $x$, or a pair of a belief and a desire plus $x$, and characterise the emotion’s intentionality in terms of these states alone. The feeling is then added on to these putatively feelingless states as a separate component, and is typically understood as a Jamesian bodily feeling, i.e. as awareness of the bodily changes involved in emotion. Opposing add-on views (and, implicitly, the functionalist view of the mind behind them$^9$), Goldie has it that emotional feelings are not nonintentional bodily feelings, but are directed towards an object that is the emotion’s intentional object. Thus an emotion’s intentionality cannot be separated from its phenomenology but is build into it: what an emotion is about – its intentional content – is part of its conscious, subjective character, i.e. of what it is like to experience the emotion.

As my characterisation of an emotion at the beginning of this section already indicates, I am here starting from the assumption that Goldie’s approach to emotional intentionality is correct so far: emotional intentionality essentially is affective intentionality. Given this premise, it seems hardly plausible that an emotion’s intentionality should be that of a judgement or a belief-desire pair. If add-on views are abandoned in favour of a synthetic account of an emotion’s

$^9$ Add-on views are nourished by the hope that emotions can be fully characterised in functional terms amenable to the impersonal perspective of the sciences. While intentionality is taken to be explainable in functional terms and therefore seen as an ‘easy problem’, phenomenal consciousness is regarded as a not yet solved and probably insoluble ‘hard problem’ (to quote David Chalmers). This is why the add-on theorist isolates emotional feelings from intentional judgements or belief-desire pairs as far as possible. On his account, feelings only enter the scene after an emotion’s intentionality has been fully characterised in functional terms, and they do so only as the nonintentional felt feedback of the bodily changes involved in emotion. Descriptions of what it is like to experience such changes from a personal perspective are dismissed as relatively unimportant, because they are compatible with completely different descriptions of the nature of those changes.
phenomenology and intentionality, it is straightforward to assume that the synthesis somehow affects the emotion’s intentionality so that it is reflected by its very nature. On my account, and here I depart from Goldie (cf. Döring 2005, in reply to Goldie 2005), an emotion’s intentionality is best understood by analogy with perception. This is at least so if it is agreed that a perception also possesses both phenomenology and intentionality, and that its intentional content is also part of its conscious, subjective character (cf. Peacocke 1992a, ch. 3, and 1992b; Döring and Peacocke 2002). I shall demonstrate in the next section that, furthermore, the content of perception is obviously structured in such a way that it does not enter inferential relations. The same will be shown for the content of emotion: Like the content of perception, and unlike the content of judgement or belief, the content of emotion is not inferentially related to the contents of other states, including other emotions. That is, in the rationalisation and justification of other states and actions the emotions play the role of perception, and in that sense, so I claim, they are perceptions.

First, this is not to say that emotions are sense perceptions. There are a number of obvious disanalogies between emotions and sense perceptions. None of them undermines the analogy, as all that my perceptual model requires is that both sense perceptions and emotions have an intentional content of a certain kind thanks to which they play a noninferential role in the rationalisation of other mental states and actions. To distinguish emotional perception from sensory perception, I shall characterise it as ‘affective perception’, due to the nature of its phenomenology which is that of a feeling or affect.

Secondly, the consciousness involved here is ‘nonreflective consciousness’. Like sense perceptions, emotions are occurrent states that can capture and occupy the subject’s attention. As always, this does not imply that they are the objects of attention (cf. Peacocke 1998; Goldie 2000, 63–70). Jean-Paul Sartre (1939, part III) already points out that we must distinguish between two ways in which a state can be conscious. In the first case, a state is ‘nonreflectively conscious’. It is conscious in that it focuses the subject’s attention on its intentional object without the subject’s having to be aware of being in that state. In the second case, a state is ‘reflectively conscious’. It is conscious in that the subject is conscious of having a conscious state as it is described as the first case: the subject is conscious of himself as being in a conscious state so that this state also becomes the object of

10 For a pioneering discussion of the analogy between sense perception and the emotions see Ronald de Sousa (1987, 149–56 and ch. 7). For further support of this analogy see, e. g., Robert C. Roberts (1988 and 2003), Christine Tappolet (2000), and Catherine Elgin (2005).

11 De Sousa (1987, 150) notes (though of course he does not take as conclusive) a partial disanalogy between perception and the emotions consisting in the fact that emotions do not have organs or transducers.
attention. The first case does not entail the second. Thus you may fear a certain thing without being aware that you do. Nonetheless your fear involves a ‘something-it-is-like’ to experience that thing as dangerous. Like perceptual consciousness, emotional consciousness is consciousness of the world in the first place.\footnote{This is also accepted by philosophers who focus on the phenomenal character of the emotions. Thus, Gianfranco Soldati (2000) argues that the emotions constitute a special class of introspective states, namely, introspective consciousness of one’s own mental states. For example, if Othello is jealous because he believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, the object of his emotion is said to be his belief, rather than the putative state of affairs. However, as Soldati admits, if asked why he is jealous, Othello would reply ‘because Desdemona loves Cassio’, and not ‘because I believe that Desdemona loves Cassio’. This shows that, ultimately, emotional consciousness is consciousness of the world: Othello’s emotion is directed at the content of the belief, which, in its turn, is about the world.}

Thirdly and finally, I shall not address the issue of whether an emotion’s affective intentional content is nonconceptual in a sense to be specified. I have argued elsewhere (2004) that it is, but entering into the debate on nonconceptuality would clearly be beyond the aims and scope of this paper.\footnote{Not least it would require me to provide a satisfactory answer to a question raised by philosophers from Kant to Sellars, Davidson, and McDowell: How can a state with nonconceptual content rationalise and justify a state with conceptual content?}

4. Affective perception

Thanks to their having an intentional content, the emotions can rationalise rather than merely explain other states and actions. Imagine that, on watching the harsh punishment of a toddler who has accidentally dropped his ice cream, you become indignant; your indignation makes you intervene and protest. To rationalise your action, your emotion must in some way contain the information that the punishment is unfair or unjust, and the description under which your action is intentional and your practical reasoning resulting in the action must be suitably related to the intentional content of your indignation.

More precisely, your indignation’s content must be representational. Although representational content is also intentional, it differs from nonrepresentational intentional content in being subject to a correctness condition (cf. Peacocke 1992b). It is content that represents the world as being a certain way, and can thus be correct or incorrect. In experiencing indignation at the harsh punishment of the toddler, it seems to you that the punishment is in fact unjust: your occurrent emotional state puts forward your indignation’s content as correct. This is in analogy to the content of a sense perception. In perceiving that the cat is on the mat, it seems to you that the cat is actually there.
Pace Peacocke, the notion of representational content need not exclude imagined content; nor need it exclude content recalled from memory.\(^{14}\) If you are fearful that your boss will fire you or feel guilty and ashamed about something you did in the past, the world is represented as being a certain way, namely, as a world in which you lose your job or in which you did something wrong.\(^{15}\) Imaginative representation can be said to be subject to a correctness condition in the sense that its correctness depends on whether it is a representation of a ‘real possibility’ (\(wirkliche Möglichkeit\)), to borrow a phrase from Robert Musil (1930, 17) again. In a similar way, representation from memory has a correctness condition in that it is to represent something that really happened.

Of course we must distinguish emotional representations, which are concerned with what \(is\) the case from emotional representations that are representations of what \(could\ be\) or of what \(has\ once\ been\) the case. For the purpose of this paper, I shall confine myself to emotions of the first kind, thereby skating over a number of complications. Nonetheless it is important to emphasise that the affective-perception view need not exclude emotions of the two latter kinds. Neither the notion of representation nor the analogy with sensory perception requires that, to qualify as an affective perception, an emotion must present its intentional object to the senses. (Remember my distinction between sense perception and affective perception in the preceding section.) You may lie awake at night, fearing that your boss will fire you, and your emotion may be an affective perception without this requiring that your boss is standing in front of you in your bedroom.

In so far as it has a correctness condition, perception, be it sensory or affective, resembles belief. In this respect seeing and believing are alike. Yet the crucial difference is that in the case of belief the subject regards the content as true, whereas in the case of perception, for the subject, the content just has the appearance of truth. When you perceive by your senses that the cat is on the mat it seems to you that the cat is actually there, but you need not endorse that content. You may be aware that the lighting conditions are such that you could well confuse a cat with a rat. The same holds for the content of emotion. In fearing a snake that you suddenly encounter on a woodland path it seems to you that the snake is dangerous, and yet you may be sceptical whether the putative snake is in fact a harmless slow worm. As Roberts (1988, 191) puts it, the

\(^{14}\) Goldie (2005) pressed this objection.

\(^{15}\) For the reception of art imaginative representation is essential. Only if a recipient of the \textit{Death of a Salesman}, say, sees Arthur Miller’s portrayal of Willy Loman as a representation of the world, will it have any effect on him. This also explains why, in receiving a work of art, we can assess its appropriateness as a representation, and yet be constantly aware of its fictional character.
content of an emotion is ‘verisimilar’ by which he means to say that, for the
subject, the content has ‘the appearance of truth, whether or not she would
affirm’ its truth.

The gap between the mere appearance of things in perception and the taking
at face value of that appearance in perceptual belief is disguised by their salience
in consciousness. Being occurrent conscious states, sense perceptions and emo-
tions are very effective in causing judgements. Even if one could work out by
inference, or by memory, that the snake is dangerous, the fear of the snake, and
its representation in immediate consciousness, means that a judgement which
takes that content of the emotion at face value does not need to wait on other
means of reaching that same content, if indeed such means exist (cf. Döring and
Peacocke 2002). Whether or not there are such means, we often operate in a
default mode in which we take the content of our emotions at face value. Normally
we rely on our perceptions because it does not occur to us to ask whether the
conditions under which we perceive (such as the lighting conditions) are normal.
Other things being equal, a subject’s belief is even more strongly held and more
likely to produce action if it is based on a conscious representational state of his
own that represents the belief’s content as correct. Other things being equal, seeing
something to be the case with your own eyes is likely to produce a stronger belief
than is yielded by inference or testimony to the same content. Similarly, an
evaluation based on the representational content of an emotion will, other things
being equal, produce a stronger belief than evaluations yielded by inference or
testimony.

However, once we suspect that a sense perception or an emotion deceives us,
we are ready to switch into a different mode which reveals that a thinker need not
endorse the content of his perceptions. Sometimes we see the world as being a
certain way, but we do not, and cannot, believe what we see. With regard to
sensory perception this is illustrated by perceptual illusions such as the Müller-
Lyer illusion, in which you see the two lines as being of a different length although
you judge and even know that they are the same length (cf. the discussion in Crane
1992). Despite your better knowledge you cannot help but see one line as longer
than the other. The content of your perception is not, and need not be, revised in
light of your better knowledge. By clear contrast, had you believed at first sight
that the lines are of different length, but then learned that they are actually the
same length, you would have to revise your original belief in light of your better
knowledge. Otherwise you would have to hold inconsistent beliefs that openly
contradict each other. Even if this should be psychologically possible, from a
logical point of view, you would certainly make a mistake, as shown by the fact
that you would commit yourself to Moore-paradoxical utterances of the form
‘I know that the two lines are the same length, but I do not believe it. I believe
that one line is longer than the other’.

© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Editorial Board of dialectica
In the case of perception Moore’s Paradox does not apply. Here we have conflict but not contradiction. It is not (Moore-)paradoxical to say ‘I know that the two lines are the same length, but I do not see it. I see one line as longer than the other’. As perception is like belief in being subject to a correctness condition, a plausible explanation of this contrast is that the attitude of perception differs from the attitude of belief. In the case of belief the representation is regarded as true, whereas in the case of perception the subject does not (yet) affirm the truth of the representation. By saying ‘I see one line as longer than the other’ the speaker expresses that, in his visual perception, it appears to him that one line is longer than the other whether or not this is (regarded as) true. Thus the fact that a perception’s content need not be revised in the light of better knowledge makes it plausible to assume that perception is not the attitude of regarding something as true.

So there is a difference in attitude towards content. Is this a difference in attitude towards the same content? Or is there also a difference in content? The possibility of conflict without contradiction means that the content of both perception and emotion is not inferentially related to the contents of other states. Inferential relations holding between beliefs include obvious logical relations (for further discussion cf. Crane 1992). If you believe that $p$ you must also have certain beliefs that are the obvious logical consequences of this belief, among them the belief that not($p \& \text{not-}p$). Hence you cannot believe that $p$ and that not-$p$ simultaneously. This possibility is excluded precisely because, being the contents of belief, the content that $p$ and the content that not-$p$ are inferentially related to each other. (Again, this is not to exclude the psychological possibility, nor is it to say that people always draw the logical and material inferences which are available to them by what they believe.) Perceptual illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion now show that you can have a perception with a content which conflicts with the content of your belief, and yet there is no contradiction involved. Hence, the content of perception differs from the content of belief in not being subject to inferential constraints. It is natural to assume that inferentiality, in its turn, is determined by the specific structure of the intentional content of belief. The content of belief must be structured so as to relate beliefs inferentially to each other. The fact that sense perceptions are not inferentially related to other states suggests that their content has a different structure than the content of belief.

The same argument can be made with regard to the emotions. Like a sense perception, an emotion is not an attitude of regarding something as true and is not inferentially related to other states. Catherine Elgin (1999, 146) introduces the example of Fiona who is afraid of frogs and who cannot rid herself of seeing frogs as dangerous even though careful study has convinced her that frogs pose no threat. This is analogous to the example of the Müller-Lyer illusion. In spite of her better knowledge Fiona cannot help but see frogs as dangerous. The content
of her fear conflicts with her belief that frogs are harmless, but there is no contradiction involved.  

Some might object that what we have here is a pathological case of frog phobia. While this strategy of explaining away certain reactions might seem convincing in the example of Fiona, it does not work in an example presented by Hume. In his *Treatise* (1739/40, 148) Hume invites us to consider ‘the case of a man, who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him’. Although we are not normally hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron, we all are familiar with the experience Hume is pointing to: the fear of falling can persist even when you judge, and know, that actually you are safe. This experience need not be a pathological case of vertigo. It occurs as an ordinary reaction of ordinary people. And there are many more examples, including the fear of a gorilla in a zoo, which you believe to be safely behind bars (cf. section 3 above; cf. also Roberts 1988 and 2003; Tappolet 2000).

The inapplicability of inferential constraints to both sense perceptions and emotions is further evidenced by the fact that inferential relations do not hold between either of these kinds of states. If you see a vertical line and then you become aware of a dot above it so that you see the letter $i$, there is no such thing as deductively inferring the perception of an $i$ from the perception of a vertical line and the perception of a dot above it. It is not that you infer the conclusion that this is an $i$ from the two premises that this is a vertical line with a dot above it.

16 Bennett Helm (2001, 41 ff.) criticises the analogy between emotional conflict (i.e. conflict between emotion and better judgement or belief) and perceptual illusion. He has it that there is no conflict at all, e. g., in seeing one line as longer than the other in light of one’s better knowledge. After all, Helm says, the subject acknowledges that the content of his sense perception is a mere illusion. By contrast, it is claimed that an emotion like Fiona’s fear of frogs is in conflict with her better judgement. According to Helm, drawing an analogy between emotional conflict and perceptual illusion obscures this difference and explains away the conflict in the case of emotion. This objection confuses having a certain content without affirming it with regarding that content either as reliable or as illusionary or fictitious. While in being in the grip of his perception it seems to the subject that the perceptual content is true. This does not imply that the subject affirms the truth of his perception. But it does not mean either that the subject regards his perception as a mere illusion. As I have pointed out above in the default mode we rely on our perceptions. We consider them to be a reliable cognitive (sub-)system which ‘reason-tracks’, to borrow Karen Jones’s expression (2003, 190). Like our beliefs, we take our sense perceptions to constitute a cognitive system that registers and responds to environmental stimuli. This is to say, we consider sensory perception to be in the service of knowledge, and that explains why conflict is possible without contradiction. In the case of perceptual illusion, and likewise in cases in which an emotion or affective perception conflicts with belief, there is conflict because two cognitive systems, which are both authorized by the subject to gain information about the world, diverge. This need not, and does not, imply contradiction, and yet the subject is faced with a conflict.
it, and that vertical lines with dots above them are *is* (which is not true in any case; a vertical line with a dot above it could equally be a semicolon). No modus ponens involved here. Instead, you immediately see the letter *i*. The same point can be made for the content of emotion. To take up one of Goldie’s (2005) examples: If you feel that someone’s behaviour is irritating, but then start to feel amused about how over the top his irritating behaviour is, your amusement’s content cannot be deductively inferred from the content that his behaviour is irritating and the content that his irritating behaviour is way over the top. Just as you immediately see the letter *i*, you immediately see the behaviour as amusing.17

Let us, for the sake of the argument, presume that your amusement about the person’s behaviour is appropriate, and yet your friend, who is also present at the scene, fails to see it this way. All you can do to convince him of the appropriateness of your evaluation is to point to the salient features that, in your view, make the behaviour amusing. None of your hints will suffice to ‘force’ your friend to infer that the behaviour is amusing, as this does not follow from any of its saliences. To understand, he must experience the behaviour as amusing himself. Even if he should succeed in identifying the behaviour as amusing by guessing this property from the list of saliences you are pointing at, this would not be enough. In this case, he would make a prediction on the basis, say, of a probabilistic calculation or a purely intellectual pattern recognition. All he can tell in this case is that, from what he knows, the behaviour is likely to be amusing, but unfortunately he himself is incapable of experiencing it that way. Strictly speaking, he is thus excluded from ascribing the property of being amusing, be it in terms of a perception or in terms of a corresponding perceptual judgement.

It is not implausible to assume that this characteristic feature of properties like being amusing is due to the fact that they are phenomenal properties, the analysis of which must necessarily appeal to how an object perceptually appears (cf., e.g. McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987). Although I agree with this assumption, I shall here refrain from qualifying and defending it. Doing so would require, first of all, to provide a typology of the properties that are linked with certain emotions, for I do not want to insinuate that these properties are all of the same kind (cf. Mulligan 1998; Tappolet 2000). While it seems prima facie plausible to treat being amusing as a phenomenal property, this is less clear with the property, say, of

17 The basic idea underlying this claim is that the content of affective perception is *gestalt*-like (cf., in detail, Döring 2004). It implies that (pace Goldie 2005) experiencing the behaviour as amusing does not conflict with seeing it as irritating. On the contrary, the behaviour’s property of being amusing is instantiated by its property of being over the top irritating, just as a letter’s property of being an *i* is instantiated by its property of being a vertical line with a dot above it. The properties of being irritating and of being a vertical line with a dot above it then each become salient features of a higher-order property. As such they do not conflict with the higher-order property they instantiate, but function as an indispensable constituent of it.
being dangerous. As pointed out above, I second Goldie’s view that it makes a difference in content whether we evaluate something as dangerous with or without affect. But this must not make us lose sight of the fact that it is easier to infer that a gorilla whose cage has been left open is dangerous than it is to infer that someone’s behaviour is amusing. For the present, I shall leave at this and show instead how, presuming that the affective-perception view is correct, it may help us to resolve the internalist dilemma.

5. How to solve the internalist dilemma

In the first part of this paper it has been argued that neither the Humean nor the Kantian approach to practical reason is able to meet the requirement of motivational internalism. In the second part I have introduced the emotions as affective perceptions. In this third and final part I shall now show how integrating the emotions into practical reasoning accounts for motivational internalism.

The affective-perception view has three important consequences. First, an emotion can play a rational role only if its content is endorsed by the subject. In experiencing an emotion it appears to the subject that the world is as his emotion represents it to be, but he need not affirm the correctness of the representation. Therefore he must take his emotion’s content at face value, and that is: make a corresponding judgement, before the emotion can make it rational to act in a certain way. The role of emotion in reasoning is, in other words, prior to its role in the rationalisation of action. Secondly, in being taken at face value, the representational content of an emotion can be an input to content-involving practical reasoning and to the explanation of action, without the need for any inference from the occurrence of the emotion. This is parallel to the fact that sense-perceptual belief made rational by the representational content of the subject’s experience is not a matter of an inference from the occurrence of the experience. Thirdly, the fact that emotions have representational content opens up the possibility that the occurrence of an emotion to a thinker can, in suitable circumstances, entitle him to judge, and possibly to know, its content simply by taking that content at face value.

Because my concern in this paper is exclusively with subjective reasons for action (in the sense specified above), I shall not address the third issue. The question of what the conditions are under which a subject is entitled to take the representational content of an emotion at face value will remain open. I shall also leave open what kind of entities are represented by emotion. That issue is a special case of the general issue of the place of the emotions in value theory (cf., e.g. de Sousa 1987; Mulligan 1998; Tappolet 2000; Döring 2004). Presuming that a thinker may be perceptually entitled to a value judgement about his environment through taking at face value the content of his emotion (cf. Peacocke 1992a, ch. 3,
and 1992b; Döring and Peacocke 2002), I am here exclusively dealing with the question of how this procedure can provide the thinker with a reason to act which is both normative (justifying) and motivating.

Taking at face value the content of an emotion may correspond to the non-inferential justification of a moral judgement’s content. Moral judgements (carefully speaking, at least particular among them) are paradigm cases of judgements that imply the existence of reasons for acting. As an example, let us consider again the person who becomes indignant at the harsh punishment of a toddler who has accidentally dropped his ice cream. In experiencing indignation, the person sees the punishment as unfair or unjust. In taking her emotion at face value, she comes to judge that the punishment is unjust. I assume that the person would not have judged that content had she not experienced the indignation; otherwise her emotion would not be explanatorily significant. Furthermore, I take it for granted that the person’s judgement implies the existence of a reason for acting. The person judges that the punishment is unjust and that, therefore, she ought to take action against it.

Some would object that a judgement of the content ‘x is unjust’ is a value judgement, which must be distinguished from the normative judgement ‘I ought to take action against x’. Only a normative judgement, so the objection goes, implies the existence of a reason for acting. I agree that value judgements do not entail normative judgements. But this does not exclude that value judgements can justify normative judgements. Thus, the person can infer from her value judgement that the punishment is unjust and that she ought to take action against the punishment, if it is possible for her to link her value judgement with other judgements so that the conjunction justifies the normative judgement. If this is possible, emotions can, via judgements, rationalise actions. For reasons that are made clear immediately below, it is not unreasonable to assume this possibility. Let me first explain why, and in what sense, the emotions can motivate actions. We shall see that the emotions’ motivational force is inextricably tied to their capacity to rationalise actions.

Many have tried to force the explanation of action by emotion into the mould of the belief-desire model. Emotions are held to resemble desires in having a ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’ (cf. section 2 of this paper). Against this I argued elsewhere (2003) that the emotions’ motivational force cannot be explained this way. If at all, an emotion must have exactly the opposite direction of fit, for the evaluation it contains is a representation in the first place. Representational content aims at correctness (so to speak), which is at fitting the world, and hence the opposite of aiming at changing the world in such a way that it fits the emotion.

Some have claimed, therefore, that emotions must have both directions of fit. This claim is in conflict not only with the fact that ‘mind-to-world direction of fit’ and ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’ are defined so as to exclude each other.

© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Editorial Board of dialectica
mutually (cf. Smith 1987, 56–9; 1994, ch. 4). Furthermore, it fails to account for the fact that emotional evaluations do not entail that the world needs to be changed in any way. Like the judgements they can noninferentially justify, the emotions involve evaluations, and these evaluations do not entail that something needs to, ought to, or can be done. You may, for example, experience joy at your success, sentimentally long for your former lover, or grieve for a beloved one’s death, while at the same time lacking a goal or an end for action. In grieving for a beloved one’s death it is even impossible to change the world in such a way that it fits the emotion, as you cannot undo the person’s death. Nevertheless these emotions are capable of motivating an action. You may jump out of joy, kiss the picture of your former lover, or moan out of grief.\textsuperscript{18} This means that your emotion has motivational force independently of having a ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’. Accordingly, that metaphor is inappropriate for explaining the emotions’ motivational force.

A more fruitful strategy, which also sheds light on how normative judgements may be justified by evaluations, starts by noting that, after all, emotional evaluations do involve an ‘ought’. This ‘ought’ however is not the ‘ought-to-do’, but amounts to what Charles Dunbar Broad (1930, 141 f.) has characterised as the ‘ought-to-be’. A distinctive characteristic of the emotions consists in that they represent their objects in light of the subject’s concerns. To represent something as fearsome, unjust, amusing, joyful, sad, or the like, is not just to distinguish it from other things in the world, but also to classify it with regard to the importance or worthiness it has for oneself. This way of classifying things manifests itself in how we react emotionally (cf. section 3 of this paper). Our emotional reactions are concern-based evaluations, and as such they reveal that we do not only look at the world under the aspect of how it is. We also assess things in light of our sense of how they ought to be. Emotions occur in the face of deviations. Thus grief and joy may be described as evaluations of something in the world in light of one’s sense of how the world ought to be. While grief occurs at the loss of a part of one’s ideal world, joy is experienced when something valuable is gained. An emotion can also focus on one’s being a certain kind of person. Such ‘reflexive’ emotions include pride and shame (as opposed to the ‘nonreflexive’ emotions grief and joy whose objects are things in the world). While pride occurs when one sees oneself as having succeeded to be the kind of person one ought to be, shame is experienced as a reaction to not meeting one’s own standard.

\textsuperscript{18} All these actions are expressions of an emotion. The explanation of expressive action is a touchstone for the belief-desire model as this kind of action is characterised by an absence of means-end reasoning: An action that is genuinely expressive of emotion is not performed by the agent as a means to some further end. Nor is the expressive action performed because it has some attractive feature, in the way that throwing a ball can have the attractive feature of being fun (cf. Hursthouse 1991; Smith 1998; Goldie 2000; Döring 2003).
On the one hand, the ‘ought-to-be’ involved in an emotional evaluation differs from the ‘ought-to-do’ in that it does not imply ‘can’. While the principle that ought implies can is a conceptual necessity for the ‘ought-to-do’, it does not apply to the ‘ought-to-be’. This in turn allows us to account for the emotions’ motivational force without overintellectualising it. It can now be explained how the content of an emotion may contain an ‘ought’ without this implying that an end for action is provided so as to rationalise motivation by emotion in terms of means-end reasoning. In grieving for a beloved one’s death you are motivated to do something because the world does not fit your sense of how it ought to be. But this does not imply that your emotion provides you with an end for action and disposes you to act in such a way that this end is realised. In terms of means-end rationality it would be equally rational for you to do nothing at all, as nothing can undo the person’s death.

On the other hand, if emotional evaluations involve an ‘ought’ it seems reasonable to assume that they should be capable of rationalising actions. If we take the example of the person who becomes indignant at the toddler’s harsh punishment, practical reasoning starts with the indignation’s representational content. Under the premise that emotional evaluations imply an ‘ought-to-be’, experiencing the punishment as unjust means that it is an event in the world which ought not to have happened. In taking the content of her indignation at face value, the person comes to judge that the punishment ought not to have happened. Let us suppose in addition that the person sees it as possible to avoid further events of the same type by taking action against the toddler’s harsh punishment, and that she holds it to be in her power and responsibility to do so. The person may then conclude that she ought to take action against the punishment, and that is: make a normative judgement that implies the existence of a normative reason for action.

We are now in a position to resolve the internalist dilemma. In judging that she ought to take action against the punishment the person has not only a reason but is also motivated to do so. This is so because the chain of reasoning which leads to that judgement starts from an emotion. As we have seen, emotions are capable of both rationalising and motivating, although their representational content is not that of belief, nor is their motivational force that of desire. The person’s judgement that she ought to take action against the punishment has motivational force due to the justifying relation holding between her judgement and her emotion. This relation forms a link in the form of necessary connection, and, because of that link, the emotion’s motivational force is transmitted to the judgement.

The required transmission does not amount to a relapse into externalism. The judgement’s motivational force essentially depends on its content. Therefore, the motive for acting is not external to the proposition which provides the corresponding practical reason, but, thanks to the essentially content-involving rationalising
or justifying connection holding between the emotion’s and the judgement’s content, internally connected with that proposition.

Compared with the two possible ways of instantiating the belief-desire model, the Humean and the Kantian, this account has the advantage that motivation by states capable of explaining action and rationalisation by states with a certain kind of content are no longer irreconcilable. Motivation and rationalisation rather come to be seen as mutually dependent: while the motivational force of the person’s judgement that she ought to take action against the punishment depends on its being necessarily and thus internally connected with the experience of indignation at that punishment, conversely, the indignation’s being an input to practical reasoning depends on the endorsement of its representational content. By contrast with Humean desires, the emotions do therefore not constitute an arational foundation of practical reasoning of which it is unclear how it could play its supposed role of rationalising action. Instead their content-involving rationalising function is inextricably tied to that of other states: if emotions rationalise action, they do so only via the judgements they can noninferentially justify.\footnote{This is an essential dissimilarity between my affective perception view and Mark Johnston’s (2001) ‘affective desire’ view which otherwise display significant similarities. (I am indebted to one of the anonymous referees for \textit{dialectica} for pointing me to Johnston’s very inspiring article.) Although Johnston’s central aim is to show that projectivism cannot account for what he calls the ‘authority of affect’, he also makes a claim about internalism that seems similar to the claim defended in this paper. He states that ‘affect is akin to perceptual experience’ (p. 189), and that it can make true ‘immediate (i.e. non-inferential) judgement’ (Johnston 2001, 205), where the judgement is understood as an evaluative judgement. ‘Since affect is also motivating’, Johnston says, ‘it follows that the one who makes the judgement will have an appropriate action-guiding orientation toward the thing judged valuable’ (206). This seems to say that a person who comes to judge that a certain thing is valuable through affectively perceiving that thing as valuable has a reason for action and is motivated to act accordingly. (Johnston adds in brackets ‘This is the best I can do for the otherwise too ambitious claims of internalism’. I read this as saying that the reason is motivating but need not be overriding.) A minor dissimilarity between Johnston’s and my own account is that Johnston writes in terms of noninferential evaluative knowledge, whereas I avoid mention of knowledge, or truth, because I do not want to get involved into the metaphysics of value (cf. my remarks above). More important seems to be that Johnston focuses on ‘affect’ or ‘affective desire’ in contrast to ‘emotion’, whilst I am concerned with ‘emotion’ in contrast to ‘desire’. However, this might be a mere terminological difference. Like Scanlon’s (1998, pp. 39 ff.) ‘desires in the directed-attention sense’, or Goldie’s (2000, pp. 24 ff.) ‘emotional desires’, Johnston’s affective desires are not those merely functional states which the Humean relies on and which I am distinguishing from emotion. To clarify his notion of affective desire, Johnston adapts Quinn’s example of the man who feels an urge to turn on every radio he sees (cf. 190; cf. section 2 above). He emphasises that this urge does not qualify as an affective desire, as it would not render intelligible to the subject what he is doing. Intelligibility, Johnston insists, requires affect. According to him, affect presents the world we sense as appealing or repellent, as ‘layered with significance, . . . and does this prior to any deliberation or planning of action on our part’ (188 f.). Under this description Johnston’s affects fall into the class of my affective perceptions. In turn, this means that they fall into the class of my emotions. Johnston makes a contrast between affect and emotion because he pictures emotions as states ‘which typically arise after one is drawn or repelled by something’,}
6. Perception in practical reasoning

It has been my aim in this paper to explain how a normative practical reason can at the same time be a motivating reason, which is to say that a normative practical reason must be potentially explanatory of action. It need not be overriding. On the contrary, to allow for cases of practical irrationality, it must be possible that an agent fails to respond appropriately to an available reason (cf., e.g. Korsgaard 1986). The model proposed in this paper accounts for practical irrationality, if simply because motivational transmissions may suffer from ‘friction’ or ‘seeping losses’ as the ‘distance’ between normative judgement and supporting emotion increases. More important is the fact that a normative judgement is not made in isolation, but as part of a person’s whole cognitive system. The person’s judgement that she ought to take action against the harsh punishment of a toddler may, for example, conflict with her judgement that parents have the right to determine the upbringing of their children. The latter judgement may have an emotion in its favour as well, such as respect or humility to others. Less pompously, the person may just not have the courage to stand up for what she believes is right. Fear and embarrassment may prevent her from intervening, even though she does not endorse these emotions.

and which necessarily involve ‘consciousness of one’s position vis à vis the repellent and the appealing’ (182).

By contrast, an emotion as I conceive it can, but need not, be judgement-based, nor need it be reflectively conscious (cf. section 3 and 4 above). I hesitate to combine affective perception with desire, even if it is affective desire (or desire in the directed-attention sense, or emotional desire). For reasons pointed out above and elsewhere (Döring 2003 and 2004) I believe that we must find an explanation of emotional motivation which departs from the Humean theory, and I am suspicious that the term ‘desire’ is often used in combination with ‘emotion’ or ‘affect’ so as to suggest that emotions are motivating, yet without providing an alternative to the Humean theory. Of course this suspicion does not release me from answering the question of how desire could be integrated into the affective perception view (David Pugmire pressed me on this: ‘Poor old desire was shown to be devoid on its own of intrinsic rationally motivating powers; then it just disappeared, to be supplanted by emotion, and one wonders where it has gone’; personal conversation.) Yet I shall not address this question in this paper. Let me finally turn to what I consider to be a major, an essential dissimilarity between Johnston’s and my own view. Johnston has it that affect can directly rationalise action ‘without going by way of the evaluative beliefs which it makes true’ (Johnston 2001, 206). This is in contrast to my claim that experiencing an emotion does not imply that the subject endorses the content of his emotion. For it follows from this claim that an action is rationalised or made intelligible to the subject only if he takes the content of his emotion at face value, and that is: if he makes a corresponding perceptual judgement. In the next section I shall argue that an action, which is directly caused by an emotion, may be rational from an objective point of view. But, for the subject, rationality or intelligibility requires the taking at face value of his emotion. I suspect that, ultimately, the source of this dissimilarity is the notion of representational content as explained in section 4 above. This notion raises all sorts of issues that I am skating over here in order to stick to my argument.
But, one might object, isn’t this to say that whether we comply with our normative judgements is entirely a matter of what emotions we happen to have? The point of this objection is that the model I am here proposing might be unable to retain the normative force of rational requirements in cases such as akrasia or weakness of will, in which we knowingly and deliberately flout them (cf. Wallace 1999, 231 ff.). How can this model account for the common assumption that we are capable of responding appropriately to an available reason on occasions when we fail to do so? After all, it seems beyond our power to control our emotional reactions.

Meeting this objection would require, first of all, exploring its underlying presumptions. It is not uncontentious that emotions are passive. Furthermore, it may be a common assumption in everyday life that, when we fail to do what we think is best, we can do so in full knowledge and with the freedom to avoid the failure, but this assumption has been disputed in philosophy since ancient times. Rather than entering into these far-reaching debates, let me sketch the overall picture of practical reason and ethics on which the objection ultimately rests. This will explain why the mistake that we make in not acting in accordance with our deliberate understanding is considered to be so serious that agents must somehow be endowed with the power of avoiding it. I shall then conclude by contrasting the picture in question with an alternative one, in which it turns out that, in failing to comply with his normative judgement, an agent may sometimes make the better choice.

The picture that I mean becomes particularly clear in Kantian theories of practical reason and ethics. The Kantian treats motivational states as noncognitive, whether they are desires or emotions. In this respect he does not differ from the Humean (which, it should be noted, does not do justice to Hume’s own account of the passions in the second book of his Treatise). In addition to this, the Kantian leaves no room for perception in the justification of action (cf. Vieth and Quante 2001). Typically, the role of perception in practical reasoning is reduced to the passive providing of inputs (‘stimuli’) from the external world, which are then actively and inferentially processed by reason. Within this picture, ethical knowledge can be gained only by the inferential means of reason and judgement. The rightness of an action solely depends on whether its maxim passes the Categorical Imperative test. This makes clear why, within this picture, acting from a motive other than reason is not appreciated.

The Kantian picture is challenged if the emotions are introduced as cognitive motives for action, which are not judgements but perceptions of evaluative

---

20 Sartre (1939) and, more recently, Solomon (1973) have argued that emotions are not passive but chosen.

21 A prime example is Aristotle’s analysis of akrasia (EN VII.5, 1146b 31 ff.).
properties. This opens up the possibility that, when it comes to a conflict between a normative judgement and an emotion, it may be the judgement rather than the emotion which gets things wrong. Here we may consider an example used by Alison McIntyre (1990). After having helped his friend Jim to run away from slavery, Mark Twain’s character Huckleberry Finn decides to turn him in. But when he is given the opportunity to do so, Huck finds himself doing just the contrary. Instead of turning Jim over to the slave hunters, he lies in order to protect his friend. In so far as it is his friendship and sympathy for Jim that causes him to act this way, Huck’s action is motivated by emotion. The crucial point now is that, while Huck does not endorse his emotion but castigates himself for his weakness, Twain gets the reader to believe that his protagonist actually did the right thing. This suggests that an emotional action, which is akratic or weak-willed in terms of the subject’s first-person perspective, may be regarded as rational from a third-person, possibly more objective, point of view. Moreover, the subject himself may later come to the conclusion that he made an error in judgement. In retrospect, the subject may recognise that it was right to act out of his emotion, even though he did not see this at the moment of choice.

Compared with the Kantian picture, this, as I shall call it, ‘Aristotelian picture’ has the advantage of enabling us to gain ethical knowledge through perception. It is a general problem of the Kantian picture to account for the fact that, before the question arises whether or not an action is right, we must first perceive the particular situation in a certain way. Not only are indefinitely many descriptions of an action possible, most of which omit the aspects that raise ethical questions (cf. Herman 1993b), but also different descriptions may imply inconsistent evaluations. Thus, it makes a great difference whether Huck’s way of acting is seen either as stealing property from its rightful owner or as helping a human being to get the freedom he is entitled to. This is to say, first, that perception, and in particular the perception of evaluative properties, is an integral part of the justification of action. Secondly, on the view defended here, this means that emotion is an integral part of the justification of action.

An emotion can lead a thinker to judge a content involving an evaluative notion, a content that he would not in fact otherwise have judged. The reader of Twain’s story may share Huck’s sympathy for Jim. By contrast with the protagonist, he may take the representational content of his emotion at face value, thereby coming to judge that slavery is inhuman and therefore ought to be abolished. It may be that this judgement does not follow from the principles about human rights he had hitherto held. The occurrence of the emotion in this case may lead to the formulation of new, better, more comprehensive principles. The same

22 This example is due to Jonathan Bennett (1974).
23 Similar cases are described by Arpaly (2000), Jones (2003), and Tappolet (2003).
may happen in the case of any other emotion. Grief at the loss of someone or some state of affairs may show one for the first time how valuable that person or state of affairs was. Guilt may rationally make one come to judge, for the first time, that a certain type of action one performed was wrong. Hope can also operate in this way. One’s unexpected state of hoping for something may for the first time lead one to judge that the thing is valuable.

This leads me back to the question from which I started: The emotions’ rationality in this sense is not only independent of whether they are under the subject’s rational control; it even requires that the subject cannot, at least not fully, control his affective perceptions so as not to exclude ‘productive conflicts’ between perception and judgement. Here, the analogy to sensory perception is illuminating again. The fact that sense perceptions are not under the direct rational control of the subject who enjoys them does not mean that perception has no role to play in making judgements, actions, and other states rational. On the contrary, sense perceptions are typically seen to play an essential, a constitutive role in the production of knowledge, and not least because they can teach our intellect otherwise.

It has not been the point of this paper to explain how the emotions can play a similar role. Yet if they do, i.e. if, first, conditions can be specified under which we are entitled to take the content of our affective perceptions at face value, and if, secondly, we can rely on our affective perception to a similar extent as on our sense perceptions, this sustains the Aristotelian idea that doing the right thing is mainly a matter of seeing things right.\textsuperscript{24} Whenever we decide what to do we must in the first place see what to do. This is to say, practical reasoning cannot but start with perceiving the particular decision situation in a certain way, which always implies an evaluation of that situation. In its turn the evaluation, by justifying a normative judgement in the way described above, typically equips us with a prima facie reason for action. It is in this sense that we see what to do. Typically, as long as we are operating in the default mode, we act on such prima facie reasons, and

\textsuperscript{24} This idea is revived by the most influential proponents of contemporary virtue ethics. For example, John McDowell (1998) holds that, ultimately, moral knowledge issues from moral perception, i.e. from a distinctive ‘sensitivity’ which allows a virtuous person to see what to do through her properly trained emotional responses. The crucial question is what is meant by ‘seeing’ or ‘perceiving’ in this context. While McDowell’s own talk of moral perception seems to be merely metaphorical (cf. McDowell 1998, p. 132 f.; cf. also Jacobson 2005, 387 ff.), Goldie (2007) claims that we can literally perceive deontic facts. I agree with Goldie in that our perception of deontic facts or of other people’s psychological states is perception in the literal sense. But I disagree that this kind of perception is \textit{sensory} perception; it is \textit{affective} perception. This analysis does justice to Aristotle’s idea of a distinctive ‘eye of the soul’ – i.e. of an ‘eye’ which is not a sense organ but is somehow related to feeling or emotion –, and yet it does not postulate some mysterious faculty of intuition but enables the virtue ethicist to embrace a realistic psychology.
we are justified in doing so to the extent that we are entitled to endorse our affective perceptions. Compared with modern ethical theories, this is not only an immense relief for the rational agent, who is freed from the burden of having to justify himself for each of his ethical decisions by inferential means (such as the Categorical Imperative test). Furthermore the problem of rational motivation is resolved, which occupies modern thinking since Hume and Kant. For seeing what to do necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. To show this has been the central aim of this paper.*

REFERENCES


* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Cambridge, Manchester, Bielefeld, and Bonn. I am grateful to the audiences on these occasions, and especially to Holger Baumann, Timothy Chappell, Ronald de Sousa, Peter Goldie, Bennett Helm, David Pugmire, Jan Slaby, and two anonymous referees for discussions and written comments that have helped me greatly with the paper.


James, W. 1884, ‘What Is an Emotion?’ Mind 9, pp. 188–205.


© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Editorial Board of dialectica
SCANLON, T. M. 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Editorial Board of dialectica