CHAPTER 6

JAPAN AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911

The modern transformations of China and Japan were inextricably interrelated. With the advent of steam navigation both countries found isolation untenable, and the appearance of Western gunboats in the harbours of each had significance for the other. Cultural ties and a shared written language meant that the response of either country was quickly accessible to the other, and observation of the process of challenge and response invited reflection and appropriation. China's crisis with the West preceded that of Japan by a good decade and a half; Japan became fully involved with the international order in 1860, the same year that the Ch'ing Summer Palace was consumed by flames kindled by the British-French expedition. Thereafter the determination of Japanese leaders to preserve national unity against the foreigner drew reinforcement from the ruinous disunity of China in the 1860s. Soon Japan's drive for modernization provided encouragement and a warning for China. By the turn of the century Japan's leap to international equality had made its institutions the natural focus of learning for a generation of young Chinese.

The rapid shift of images each country held of the other during these years provides a field for analysis that is only now becoming fruitful. In Japanese eyes the Chinese changed from the thoughtful, introspective sages who peopled the paintings of the Tokugawa artists to the hapless rabble the print makers of 1895 showed in full flight before Japan's modern troops. Eventually they became the awkward, self-conscious students who drew the hoots of street urchins for their hair and dress in early twentieth-century Tokyo. In Chinese eyes the Japanese, remembered as dwarfs who had troubled the serenity of the late Ming, returned as modernized neighbours who offered to lead them into a bright new future that in fact turned out to contain a new Asian imperialism. At mid-century a Japanese government pronouncement warned that Westerners should be treated with as much respect as if they were Chinese, but on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War Japanese leaders were warning their countrymen against uncritical acceptance of the Western scorn of Chinese weakness. Chinese leaders first praised, then came to fear, Japanese achievements, and warned that the
Japanese should be regarded as even more dangerous than Westerners. Then, as the urgency of modernization became apparent, Japan's modernized institutions nevertheless became the objects of study, and Japan itself a breeding ground for revolution in China. Since China and Japan interacted so importantly in their respective modern histories, it is useful to look at both sides of the relationship.

**The Opening of China as a Warning to Japan**

China's contribution, however unwitting, to the modernization of Japan provides an appropriate beginning for this discussion. Its dimensions were several. There was the importance of the news of danger, and of direct observation and experience in China. Experience in the West itself brought to Japan a sense of competition with China. Less central, though significant, was the benefit of Chinese translations from the West.

Scholars agree on the importance of the sense of alarm that gripped mid-nineteenth-century Japan at the approach of the Western world, and it is clear that the news from China provided an important part of that consciousness. Already in the 1830s the appearance of the American ship *Morrison* in Japanese waters led to grossly inaccurate stories that that mighty Englishman, whose influence was thought to permeate the Canton area, was on his way to deal with the Tokugawa government. In 1838 the daimyo Tokugawa Nariaki predicted that Japan would be the first object of Western attack; China was too large, and the Ryūkyū Islands and Korea too small, to attract the warships. After reports of the Chinese defeats came in, proving him wrong, the impact was great. 'This concerns a foreign country,' the shogunal minister Mizuno Tadakuni wrote to a subordinate, 'but I think that it should provide a good warning for us.'¹ Soon Dutch and Chinese traders brought Chinese publications to Nagasaki.

Wei Yuan's works circulated widely in Japan, where they were accessible to all who were literate. His *Hai-kuo t'u chib* (Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms) appeared in many Japanese editions. Wei Yuan's discussion of the wisdom of learning from the West in material and technological respects, and his assumption that such steps could be reconciled with orthodoxy in moral and political concerns, was congenial to many of his Japanese readers. Sakuma Shōzan, who read Wei after he had already

submitted a recommendation on coastal defence to his lord, was struck by
the resemblance between his thought and that of Wei Yuan. ‘When the
English barbarians were invading the Ch’ing empire’, he wrote, ‘I submit-
ted a plan in a memorial. Later I saw the Sheng wu chi of the Chinese writer
Wei Yuan . . . . Wei and I were born in different places and did not even
know each other’s name. Is it not singular that we both wrote lamenting
the times during the same year, and that our views were in accord without
our having met? We really must be called comrades from separate lands.’

As news from China increased in quantity and quality in mid-century
Japan, it became an important element in the mounting sense of crisis that
pervaded the land. The information made available by Wei Yuan made it
possible for Yoshida Shōin to make a connection between the braves
demobilized after the Opium War and the disorders in Kwangtung. Such
news influenced the power elite profoundly. Its full import was delayed by
the confusing nature of reports about the rebellions in China. They came
from a variety of sources, some from Korea through accounts of the
daimyo of Tsushima, others from China through merchant ships, from
Nagasaki through Dutch reports, from a Japanese active for several years
on the China coast, and from Chinese publications carried by a Cantonese
who sailed with Perry. Japanese reports of the Taiping Rebellion began
with stories of Ming revival and English support for the Ming partisans.
Gradually, more accurate and official Chinese accounts permitted readers
to make an association between Christianity, rebellion and the enormous
losses of life and property. In the 1860s direct accounts from Japanese who
got to Shanghai were further reinforced and confused by fictional narratives
of epic battles between Ming partisans and Ch’ing armies. Many such
accounts drew on the old Koxinga tradition of supporting their heroes, but
more and more related Chinese disasters to foreign intervention and
conquest.

The most important result of the Japanese perception of Chinese

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3 For a discussion of Japanese editions and influence of the Hai-kuo t’u-chib, see Wang Chia-
chien, ‘Hai-kuo t’u-chib tui-yü Jih-pen-ti ying-hsiang’ (The influence of the Hai-kuo t’u-chib
in Japan), in Ta-hu tsu-chib, 32.8 (April 1966) 242—9. Translations came out in 1854 and con-
tinued into the early Meiji period. For its impact on Shionoya Tōin (1810—67), an influential
Confucian who edited one of the early Japanese editions, see R. H. van Gulik, ‘Kakkaron: a
Japanese echo of the Opium War’, Monumenta Serica, 4 (1939) 478—545. Sakuma Shōzan’s
admiration did not however extend to Wei Yuan’s discussion of guns. ‘It is’, he noted, ‘for the
most part inaccurate and unfounded. It is like the doings of a child at play. No one can learn
the essentials of a subject without engaging personally in the study of it. That a man of Wei’s
talent should fail to understand this is unfortunate.’ Quoted in Ryusaku Tsunoda, William
Theodore deBary, and Donald Keene, eds. Sources of the Japanese tradition, 614.

3 For the course and sequence of Japanese intelligence about Taiping successes, see Ichiko
Chūzō, ‘Bakumatsu Nihonjin no Taihei Tengoku ni kansuru chishiki’ (Japanese knowledge of
the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace in late Tokugawa times), in Kaikoku Hysukunen Kinen
Bunka Jigyōkai, ed. Meiji bunkashi ronbū (Essays in Meiji cultural history), 453—95.
disasters was the resolve not to repeat the Chinese experience. First-hand observation of that experience began to be collected by Japanese who travelled to Shanghai in the 1860s, and it provided significant reinforcement for views of crisis and response. The first ship sent to Shanghai was the *Chitose Maru* which went in 1862, and since its passengers, all commissioned by their political authorities, included Bakufu, Chōshū, Saga, Owari and Ōmura samurai as well as merchants, their travel records, supplemented by those of others who travelled beyond Shanghai to Europe, provided important documentation of the direct impact in Japan of the state of affairs along the China coast.4

For numbers of Japanese the forest of foreign masts in Shanghai harbour was convincing proof of the impossibility of continuing the old patterns of seclusion.5 Equally impressive to many was the evidence of Western superiority and arrogance in the arrangements for the defence of Shanghai, and the apparent fear with which the Chinese regarded the Westerners. Out of this came a heightened conviction of the need to prepare for resistance to the West through acquisition of Western arms. The China coast, and especially Shanghai, also served as an entrepot for the arms and equipment that provided the military strength of the Bakufu and its enemies. The Japanese branches of China coast trading firms, like Jardine, Matheson and Company, especially at Nagasaki, provided access to steamers and small arms for Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa. Numbers of important Restoration leaders — Takasugi Shinsaku, Godai Tomoatsu, and Gotō Shōjirō among them — found direct access to military matériel in Shanghai.

The same firms, and the same route, conveyed some of these men to Europe. Itō, Inoue, Mori, Godai, Terajima and others first experienced the West through the prism of their brief Shanghai encounters. Their letters home reported their pleasure in the distinctions Europeans were beginning to draw between the determined reforms of Japan and the more uncertain course of events in China. European discernment of Japanese efficiency and Chinese failure encouraged them. From early on one begins to see in such reactions the inception of a desire to stand with the West and not with the East, to dissociate themselves and their country from the overtones of weakness and ineffectiveness that accompanied the term ‘oriental’. A few


5 Thus Inoue Kaoru’s biographer notes that ‘When he reached Shanghai, and saw from the deck of his ship the hundred or so warships, steamships, and sailing vessels in the anchorage, and the busy scene of ships entering and leaving the harbour, he was completely taken aback. For the first time the Marquis realized the need of developing a navy in order to carry out exclusion, and for the first time he saw the full meaning of Sakuma Shōzan’s teachings and the inadequacy of simple exclusionist thought.’ Inoue Kaoru kō denki hensankai, *Seigai Inoue kō den* 1.90–1.
decades later this desire found its classic formulation in an essay by Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1885. In an editorial written in the aftermath of the failure of reform in Korea and the defeat of China by France, he called on his countrymen to ‘part with Asia’. Shortly afterwards the point was emphasized by foreign minister Inoue Kaoru in a memorandum which argued that Japan had no alternative to the establishment of a ‘Western-style empire on the edge of Asia’. All such arguments were based on the importance of avoiding identification with the disastrous course of nineteenth-century China.6

A final, and seldom noted, benefit for Japan of China’s prior contact with the West is interesting for the contrasts it offers to the later relations between the two. Early translations of Western books into Chinese contained important character-compounds that made their way into Japanese ‘modern’ thought. By the end of the century these compounds were so widely accepted in Japan that during the subsequent importation of Japanese words into China many Chinese assumed they were indebted to Japan for this vocabulary as for so much other terminology. The infusion was particularly important in the publication of translations of international law with their need for approximations of terms like ‘rights’ and ‘sovereignty’. But these remained relatively few in number in comparison with the flood of Japanese words that later entered the Chinese language. Nor was there at any time in the early self-strengthening movement a Japanese student in China for the study of modernization.

MEIJI JAPAN IN CHINESE THINKING

During the second half of the nineteenth century the image of Japan held by influential Chinese leaders gradually changed to one of grudging admiration. Early approval and even admiration of Japanese institutional changes and technological efforts can be seen in some of the writings of Feng Kuei-fen. Li Hung-chang thought well of late-Tokugawa moves for military reform. Separated as these reforms were from a full-scale and unified national movement, they seemed to combine tradition with technology, and contributed logically to thoughts of a common front against the West. These attitudes survived the early years of the Meiji Restoration. After his appointment as governor-general of Chihli in 1870 Li Hung-chang, according to one authority, was ‘impressed by Japan’s comparative success in dealing with the West . . . and by the large funds which Japan

was reported to have raised for arsenals and steamships. Li felt that China should befriend Japan, and perhaps even send officials to reside in that country, with a view to preventing her from siding with the Western nations. Then, as the Japanese used the outrages inflicted by Taiwanese aborigines on Ryūkyūan fishermen as an excuse to claim the Ryūkyū Islands in 1874 and to move against Taiwan, Li and his colleagues began to see in Japan a possible source of danger. The Meiji changes now began to seem too completely emulative of the West.

In a fascinating colloquy with Mori Arinori, who came to Peking after the resolution of the dispute in 1875, Li expressed surprise and shock at Japan’s willingness to cut herself off from the cultural tradition of East Asia. In the Japanese foreign office’s official English transcript of the interview, Li is quoted as saying, ‘I think very highly of almost everything that has recently been done in your country, but there is one thing I cannot so well appreciate: that is the change of your old national costume into the European fashion... The costume is one of those things that recall the sacred memory of the ancestors and ought to be kept on with reverence by the posterity forever.’ In response Mori assured him that ‘If our ancestors were still living they would without doubt do exactly what we have done... about a thousand years ago they adopted the Chinese costume as they then found it better than the one they had.’ ‘You might’, Li countered, ‘with wisdom have adopted the Chinese costume... it is very convenient... and can be made entirely out of the materials produced in your own country.’ But, noted Mori, ‘None of your ancestors four hundred years ago could have willed the change of their costume that took place afterwards at the commencement of the present dynasty [i.e. the wearing of the queue]. Change is change, and moreover this change of yours was forced upon you despite your disliking it.’ But while Li warned Mori against excessive Westernization and spoke darkly of the danger of foreign loans, in a memorial of December 1874 he cited these with other measures as basis for the observation that Japan’s ‘power is daily expanding, and her ambition is not small’. And by 1885 he wrote that ‘In about ten years, Japan’s wealth and power will be considerable. She is China’s future disaster, not our present anxiety.’ And at the end of those ten years, when Li’s prophecy had come true and he himself appeared before Ito Hirobumi to sue for peace at Shimonoseki, he still strove for some way to ‘be brothers instead of ene-

8 I am indebted to Professor Hayashi Takeji, formerly of Tōhoku University, for the English text of the discussion. A Japanese version appears in Kimura Kō, Mori Sensei den (Biography of Mori), 102, and the exchange is also quoted by Sanetō Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shikō (Draft history of Chinese students in Japan), 64–5.
mies . . . A thing which is detrimental to one of us must also be so to the other . . . It is quite time the yellow race should prepare against the white.'

Ironically, however, it was the war with Japan in 1894-5 that was pivotal for Chinese attitudes towards Meiji modernization. In China, as elsewhere, the war was accepted as a test of the effectiveness of the modernization steps taken in both countries, and the success of Japanese arms and the contrast between united effort in Japan and sectional responsibility in China left little room for doubt as to which was the more effective pattern of organization. The shock of defeat by Japan was greater than was the now-accustomed aggression by Western powers. Consequently the onus for defeat was not borne entirely by Japan. It was shared in good measure by the Manchu dynasty and by Li Hung-chang. Soon the Japanese defeat was eclipsed by the new Western demands; the European powers that intervened in 1895 to act ostensibly as guarantors of Chinese territorial integrity against Japanese demands soon proceeded after 1897 to walk off with the booty they had protected. The indignation this aroused in China led directly to the Hundred Days reforms of 1898. (See pp. 318ff.)

Meiji Japan held a very special place in the minds of the Confucian reformers of late Ch'ing times. Its success in introducing institutions of representative government on a basis of largely traditional ideology, and its ethos of national service rather than of personal or sectional gratification, seemed to suggest a pattern which could be followed by any country seeking modernization. It is significant and appropriate that key figures in the reform circle were important in introducing to Chinese readers and leaders, the facts and applicability of the Meiji achievements. Thus Huang Tsun-hsien (1848-1905) arrived in Tokyo with the first resident Chinese Minister, Ho Ju-chang, as counsellor of legation in 1877. Huang formed numerous contacts with Japanese literary men, and wrote a history of Japan. This work, completed only after a period as consul-general in San Francisco, was finished in 1887, but it was not circulated until the time of the Sino-Japanese War and was published only in 1897 as Jib-pen kuo-chih. It was Huang who invited Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to come to Shanghai as editor of a journal of the Society for the Study of Self-Strengthening, and who stood sponsor to both T'an Ssu-t'ung and Liang in Hunan. His history of Japan came to the attention of the Kuang-hsu Emperor in 1898, at a time when its author was serving in Hunan.10

9 Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's response to the West, 119–20. The 1895 talks were recorded in English. See Morinosuke Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan 1894–1922, 202.
10 Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the mind of modern China, 23–5; and Noriko Kamachi, 'Huang Tsun-hsien'. The next significant Chinese study of Japan's modernization was Tai Chi-t'ao (Tai Ch'ien-chou 1890–1949), Jib-pen lun (On Japan), published 1928. A Japanese translation of this perceptive book is in Chūgoku (China), nos. 56–63 (July 1968 – Feb. 1969).
K’ang Yu-wei, the leading figure among the reformers, made good use of Japanese examples in his arguments. The Meiji constitution seemed to him a success and a significant element in Japan’s strength. K’ang recommended the Japanese example in his first memorial to the emperor in 1888, and he stuck to his argument thereafter. In 1898 he urged the emperor to ‘adopt the methods of Russia and Japan with which to fix the policies of the empire’, and to ‘take the Meiji government as the model of administration’. As the summer of 1898 proceeded, K’ang made less mention of Peter the Great and more of Meiji; it was now vital for China to liberalize her rules and broaden participation in government. Japan, he pointed out, was ‘geographically near to us and her governmental forms and social institutions are similar to ours’. Later K’ang repeated and developed these arguments in longer studies of Russia and Japan for the emperor. Nevertheless, his advocacy remained more general than specific. He approved of the search for new models, and he approved particularly of Japan’s constitutional reorganization. True Confucian principles, he thought, required the democratization of Chinese institutions. But although K’ang admired what the Japanese admired, there is little reason to think that Meiji nationalism or social structure were his goals. Before 1911 he tended to reserve higher praise for the German example, which seemed to combine freedom with the discipline he felt China needed.

Predictably, the Meiji leaders found much to approve of in the reform movement of 1898. They themselves were at this point keenly concerned about Western imperialist expansion in China, and anxious to assist Chinese resistance. Foreign minister Ōkuma Shigenobu contributed a rationale for government policy with his ‘Ōkuma Doctrine’ under which Japan, long a recipient of China’s culture and spirit in the past, would now repay that debt by holding the West at bay to provide the time necessary for China to reorganize under new leadership. Ito Hirobumi visited Peking during the Hundred Days, and was granted an audience by the emperor. After the empress dowager’s coup against the reformers, the leaders of the reform movement received Japanese protection. K’ang had English pro-

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tection as far as Hong Kong, and there boarded a Japanese vessel which took him to asylum in Japan. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, who fled to the Japanese consulate at Tientsin, proceeded to Japan on a Japanese gunboat.

The reformers were soon established as leading figures in the growing Chinese community in Japan. Their contacts tended to be with highly placed, upper-class Japanese. Ōkuma Shigenobu personally received K’ang Yu-wei, and corresponded with him thereafter. So did Prince Konoe Atsumaro. Inukai Ki and other leaders of the parliamentary movement prided themselves on friendship with their distinguished Chinese guests. As a growing student movement began to swell the Chinese community in Japan the reformers, with their intellectual and moral prestige, stood to benefit. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao especially came into his own as a publicist and spokesman for the Chinese community. He was the central figure in the establishment of a school headed by Hsu Ch’in for Chinese youths, while his advocacy of constitutional monarchy, often with arguments familiar to the Japanese setting, brought on a vigorous journalistic war with the partisans of republicanism.

At the same time the Japanese example bulked large in the governmental reforms that the dynasty undertook in the years after the Boxer Rebellion. After the Ch’ing court returned to Peking in 1902 the empress dowager accepted the rationale for administrative and educational reforms set forth in a series of memorials submitted by Chang Chih-tung and Liu K’un-i (see chapter 7). Military reforms included schools designed to train a generation of professional army officers. Japanese instructors gradually came to outnumber European, and Chinese cadets were sent in increasing numbers to military schools in Japan. The Japanese armed forces also provided the model for the administrative structure of the new Chinese armies. Legal reforms meant new law codes drawn from German and especially Japanese practice, and a number of Japanese legal scholars of later eminence began their careers as consultants and advisers in Chinese employ.

The Japanese example was particularly central to plans for constitutional institutions, especially after the Japanese defeat of Russia. Between 1906 and 1911 study missions to Japan and Europe heard the same sort of cautious advice from Itō Hirobumi that Itō had earlier heard from his German mentors. The missions concluded that the Ch’ing constitution should be conferred by the court. In 1908 the empress dowager’s announcement of a nine-year programme of preparation for constitutional government, like many of the substantive proposals that accompanied it, was taken directly from the Japanese experience of 1881–90 (see chapter 7).
No other reforms approached the long-range significance of the changes in education. In China’s switch from classical to modern thought, from traditional to Western standards and emphases, Japan played a role of critical importance. The denigration of foreign learning in China had made it controversial to send even Yung Wing’s small party of students to the United States in 1872 and had forced their return and the abolition of the educational mission in 1881. But during the decade that followed the Japanese victory over China, this attitude gave way to an emphasis on overseas study so strong that it became not only advantageous but finally even critical to one’s success in official preferment. Japan seemed to offer the most inviting, most economical, and least subversive source for such training. The Chinese student movement to Japan in the first decade of the twentieth century was probably the largest mass movement of students overseas in world history up to that point. It produced the first generation of leaders of Republican China. In size, depth and impact it far eclipsed Chinese student movements to other countries. It thus becomes possible to say, with a recent survey, that ‘the period from 1898 to 1914 saw a major Japanese influence on the course of Chinese history’.

The movement of students began after the Sino-Japanese War. The first thirteen students came to Japan in 1896. A special school was set up for them in the Kanda district of Tokyo. They had no knowledge of Japanese, and their early instruction was chiefly in language. Four of them left within the first weeks. Tedium, unpalatable food, and real or fancied abuse discouraged them. Seven finished the course, however, and became the first of the corps of Japan experts who began to produce usable Chinese textbooks on Japanese and guides to study in Japan.

The next round of European imperialist advances in China, beginning with the German seizure of Kiaochow in 1897, brought new urgency to the study of modern institutions at the same time that it made Japan more acceptable as an avenue for Westernization. With the failure of the Hundred Days in 1898, as we have noted, the leading reformers and many of their disciples fled to Japan for shelter. As the Manchu court experimented with the obscurantist tides that led to the Boxer disaster of 1900, reform-minded

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12 The authoritative works here are those of Sanetō Keishū: Meiji Nisshibunka kōshō (Cultural interchange between China and Japan in the Meiji period); Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shibō; and esp. Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi (History of Chinese students in Japan). The 1960 edn of the last-mentioned work is used throughout this chapter; statements noted are from pp. 140 and 110–11.

13 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, East Asia: the modern transformation, 631.
viceroys like Chang Chih-tung and reform-frustrated intellectuals like K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao continued to raise the esteem in which they held study in Japan.

Already in his Exhortation to study, Chang Chih-tung had pointed out that the Japanese had translated much of what was necessary from the West, and that since their language was closer and easier for Chinese students to master, Japanese books should be used. And he strongly endorsed study abroad. ‘To study in the West for one year is better than reading Western books for five years . . . to study in a Western school for one year is better than to study for three in Chinese schools.’ Japan, however, had particular advantages and lessons to offer. ‘As a country for overseas study the West is not like Japan. Japan is nearby and inexpensive for travel, so that many can go; as it is close to China, students will not forget their country. Japanese writing is similar to Chinese, and can readily be translated. Western learning is extremely varied, and the Japanese have already selected its essentials. The customs and conditions of China and Japan are comparable, and it is easy for students to conform to them. It is best to be able to concentrate one’s efforts on a small number of concerns.’ And as for the lesson to be learned, ‘Japan is only a small country, and how did it rise? It was because men like Ito, Yamagata, Enomoto, and Mutsu were students in the West twenty years ago.’

The first group of students was thus followed by others. In 1899 there were over a hundred in Japan. Emissaries from Chang Chih-tung were making surveys of study facilities. A study guide prepared under his direction was completed in 1898 and republished in 1899 and 1900, and it remained a standard guide thereafter. Chang now began sending small numbers of military specialists for study as well. Nor was enthusiasm limited to officials. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao summarized the advantages of the Japanese language: its sounds were few in number, and all of them existed in Chinese; its grammar was uncomplicated, much of its vocabulary was related to Chinese; and 60 to 70 per cent of the language was written in Chinese characters.

Leading Japanese also began to see the significance of such a movement for their own country. Scholars like Ueda Mannen and diplomats like Ōtori Keisuke began to write and speak to their countrymen about the opportunities and responsibilities that were coming with the education of their neighbours. This was also the climate in which Ōkuma Shigenobu worked out his ‘Doctrine’ of Japan’s return of its historic obligations to its mainland neighbour. Ueda and other educators called for moves to prepare special educational programmes for Chinese students and the establishment

14 Quoted in Sanetō Keishū, Chuokokuin Nihon ryōgaku ibi, 41.
of special language schools so that they could be ready for university-level work within two or three years of their arrival in Japan. Conscious also of popular ambivalence and possible insults to the Chinese, he argued for special funds to erect adequate dormitory facilities to avoid possible embarrassment, exploitation and 'corruption' of the students. Vacation tours to important parts of Japan should also be laid on to acquaint the students with all aspects of Japanese life.15

In China, meanwhile, the Boxer disaster and the failure of obscurantist anti-foreignism brought new prominence for reform-minded viceroys like Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i and new urgency to their message of educational and institutional reform. The emphasis on education abroad and the number of publications about Japanese educational opportunities rose rapidly. There now began to be a link between Japanese study and bureaucratic employment. Related to this, and ultimately the most important development of all, was the reform and final abolition of the system of civil service examinations in 1905. Instead of a grounding in the classics, study abroad was to become the basic requirement for entrance into government service.

The effect on the number of students in Tokyo was immediate. By the end of 1905 estimates of Chinese students in Japan rose to between eight and ten thousand, and for 1906, the peak year, from six to twenty thousand. So great a discrepancy in the estimates suggests the difficulties of counting in a setting in which statistics for passports, visas and school or course registrations are unreliable. Sanetö, the foremost student of this educational migration, using conservative contemporary estimates, arrives at these totals:

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At its peak the student tide included entire families, as fathers accompanied their sons, and young Chinese girls as well as women with bound feet came to learn. Only a minority of those who came were prepared for formal

15 See excerpts in ibid. 45.
work or able to gain admittance to it, so that the numbers of graduates of
Japanese schools, while still considerable, are much smaller than the num-bers in residence:  

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Few educational structures would have been equipped to cope with this
human tide. Japan's certainly was not. In response to the influx of Chinese
students a variety of steps were taken to provide some guidance. Many
special schools were established. The Seijô Gakkô, which began as a
military preparatory school for Japanese cadets, accepted Chinese students
and educated many. Other schools which played important roles were the
Nikka Gakudô, established in 1898, the Kôtô Daidô, in 1899, the Tôa Shôgyô, in 1901, the Kôbun Gakuin, in 1902, and especially the Tokyo
branch of the Dôbun Shoin, also established in 1902. The Kôbun Gakuin,
for instance, included Huang Hsing, Lu Hsun and Ch'en Tu-hsiu among
its total of 7,192 Chinese students, of whom 3,810 completed its course.
Many private institutions, and especially Waseda, opened new international
divisions to cater for their new students. Women's schools were also
opened to prepare future mothers for modernity. Opening ceremonies,
often graced with eloquent references to the mothers of Mencius and
George Washington, would have reassured Chang Chih-tung of the
advantages of study in the 'Eastern Country'.

Despite such efforts, it cannot be doubted that the majority of the
students fared poorly. Most of them were as ill-prepared for study in Japan
as Japanese institutions were to receive them. Many attended cram courses
and arrangements that stressed economy of time and concentration on the

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16 Figures from ibid. charts facing p. 145. He finds no basis for estimating student numbers for
1909–12 and 1915. A breakdown of graduates by schools (pp. 138–40) shows that institutions
range from the imperial universities to private girls' higher schools. For the period 1901–39,
Sanetô lists a total of 11,966 Chinese graduates.

17 For schools, specialties and dates, see ibid. 64–79.
cides of the hour. The majority were not enrolled in regular schools at all. Their stays consequently became shorter, and their restlessness and dissatisfaction were transmitted directly to their families and friends in China. Yet a movement of such dimensions, which produced the first generation of leaders of republican China, has to be considered of pivotal importance in the experience of the elite of this whole generation. Communications between Tokyo and China were so easy and unstructured that the impact of life abroad went far beyond those persons registered in the Japanese schools. The quality of the experience and of the influences to which the students were exposed is thus of the greatest interest and importance.

The Chinese experience in Japan can be sampled in the memoirs and autobiographies of the students. It is also documented in the surveys and reports compiled by both Chinese and Japanese authorities, and is reflected in the numerous student publications. The trip often began with encouragement from someone already gone or going. Students often returned home to encourage others to follow their example. Once they had arrived in Tokyo, the Kanda section became their home. Students put their impress upon its lodgings, business establishments and restaurants. Special shops for printing, food and even pawnshops catering for Chinese students came into existence. New publishing houses like Fuzambō began as enterprises designed to provide the translations from Japanese, and the journals and textbooks that were needed. Barbers toiled to bring the queue into some sort of conformity with the laws of modernization, and achieved a pompadoured compromise that became known as the Fuji hairdo. As local organizations in China funnelled more students into Japan, provincial organizations sprang up in Tokyo to harbour and guide them as they arrived. While students came from all parts of China, the future revolutionary centres, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kiangsu and Chekiang, were best represented.

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be detected in the account of the anarchist Ching Mei-chiu, who first came to Japan as a student in 1903. His first night in a Japanese inn was full of surprises. ‘There was a special quality about Japan. To begin with, the inns were built of wood and you had to take your shoes off before coming into the room. Here we had crossed the seas and gone abroad to study in order to prepare for a future restoration, yet once in Japan the first thing we had to do was go back to antiquity.’ Students could be expected to receive instruction leaflets warning them how to behave in Japanese society. Traffic moved to the left, one did not shout or raise one’s voice, one should not stand idling in the street, should spit only into spittoons, be meticulous about separate slippers for toilets and halls, treat maids with dignity, offer seats on crowded street cars to the old, the young and females, be careful about one’s valuables, keep one’s clothes clean, never ask another’s age, and never eat too much Japanese rice, which was hard to digest.

The actual educational experience, nominally the purpose of all this, was often unrewarding. Japanese lecturers and writers delighted in assuring the students that their country faced the same situation that Japan had in the early Meiji period. Their examples were replete with instances of Japanese who had travelled abroad for foreign learning. Exponents of each field of specialization were prepared to offer assurances that its findings were vital to the success of the Restoration government.

The central lesson most students seem to have learned was the importance of nationalism. Their experience of Japan tended inevitably to supplement their provincial consciousness with an increased sense of Chinese identity. In Kanda a national organization began to take shape under the consciousness of Chinese nationality and distinctiveness. The Chinese Student Centre in Kanda played an important unifying role. Shortly before the Revolution of 1911 the American-sponsored YMCA, also in Kanda, was able to exploit its independence of Japanese ties to eclipse the earlier student centre or kaikan, which was Japanese sponsored. But both organizations served as meeting places. Both helped to fuse provincialism with nationalism. Provincial consciousness was never lost, and most students’ primary

20 Ching went on to ruminate about Han dynasty customs, when Chinese too sat on the floor, and suggested that these still prevailed in Japan together with the exaggerated code of civility. Ryūnichi kaiko – Chūgoku anakisuto no bansei (Recollections of a sojourn in Japan – half a life of a Chinese anarchist); this is a trans. by Ōtaka Iwao and Hatano Tarō of the Japan portions of Ching’s Tsui-an (Record of a ‘crime’).

21 Sanetō Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi, 192–4, reproduces such a pamphlet, ‘Rules for students abroad’, and notes that contemporary Chinese novels sometimes described returned students as quiet and decorous.
memberships were in provincial groupings. A careful study of revolutionary organization shows that recruiting and reporting were done through provincial divisions in Tokyo. But the student meeting places, like the revolution, merged regional affiliation with national awareness.  

Japan served to strengthen the students' consciousness of nationality in many ways. Condescension and discrimination certainly played an important part. The long-sustained Japanese admiration of China and the Chinese had not survived the vainglory of the Sino-Japanese War, which government and people alike saw as a struggle between civilization and medievalism. The victory over China, coming as it did after long decades of patience in the face of unequal treatment by the West, produced a jingoism that affected all parts of Japanese society and consciousness. Popular prints, popular fiction, popular poetry and exultant songs, all acted to instil and reinforce a sudden burst of cheap and claptrap patriotism. Chinese students who came to Japan were inevitably among its first targets. Their country had been found weak, unprepared and non-modern. 'At the time of the war against China', Kōtoku Shūsui put it, 'the patriotism of Japanese developed to extremes that had never been known before. They despised the Chinese, they scorned them as effeminate, and they were hateful to them. Nor did it end with words; from white-haired elders to little children, everybody was full of bloodthirsty intentions toward the four hundred million.' The students were thus treated to a good deal of derision and contempt. Street urchins focused on their queues and followed them with shouts of 'chan chan bozu'.

The setting was one to remind Chinese constantly of their weakness and failure. A Chinese novel about student life depicted even the Japanese coolies turning back from their rickshaw shafts to ask Chinese student customers if they realized that Japan was defeating Russia, and to ask them whether that did not make them jealous.

Predictably, one effect of this was to irritate students into having their queues cut off, adopting Western dress, and passing for modern. Ching Mei-chiu describes his first attempts at conversation, by scribbling phrases in Chinese, with Japanese students at his school. 'Why don't you cut your hair?' they asked; 'we call it a pig tail.'


22 Kōtoku Shūsui, Teikokutōgi (Imperialism), 33. An Iwanami bunko reprint of the famous work of 1901.

23 Shang-hsin jen-yu (Wounded to the soul), a polemical novel by Meng Yun-sheng, published 1906. Sanetō Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi, 213.
headed straight for a barber and indicated with gestures his wish to have his queue cut.\textsuperscript{25}

These attitudes of disparagement came to be associated with the very term for China. ‘Shina’ as a term went back to T’ang times, when it had entered Chinese usage through Buddhist writings of Indian origin. Although used a good deal in late Tokugawa and Meiji times by Japanese, it alternated with ‘Ch’ing’, and the Sino-Japanese War was still referred to as the war with the ‘Ch’ing’. Thereafter Japanese used ‘Shina’ increasingly, and early in the student movement Chinese students seem to have been attracted to it through its mildly subversive overtones of avoiding reference to the dynasty. But as ‘Shina’ became associated with hooting children who ran after Chinese in the streets, it carried overtones of Chinese weakness. Chinese resentment became sharp later in the century, after republican disasters and the Twenty-one Demands. But the Meiji experience began this process.\textsuperscript{26}

Japan made a more positive contribution to Chinese nationalism through example. The last decade of the Meiji period was one of surging pride in the national achievements evident in the alliance with England and the victory over Russia. Japanese nationalism made its impress upon even profoundly unpolitically minded students. A young diarist from Honan recorded little interest in his lectures or surroundings, but showed his astonishment at Japanese patriotism. The stories of General Nogi’s loss of his sons at Port Arthur won his admiration, and he wrote that even Japanese girls were so patriotic that very few of them married Chinese students.\textsuperscript{27} Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, describing the scene at Ueno as relatives and friends arranged festive send-offs for young men entering the army, described a banner inscribed with three characters ‘grant death in battle’. ‘On seeing this I was astonished and respectful,’ he wrote, ‘unable to put it out of my mind.’ Japan had a ‘Yamato damashii’ or Yamato spirit; nothing was more urgent for China than to develop a ‘China damashii’. Liang went on to stress the identification of self and country as the most urgent need, so that common people would feel possessive about their country. Participation would only follow identification. When a work appeared by a

\textsuperscript{25} Ching Mei-chiu, \textit{Tsu-i-an}, 34.

\textsuperscript{26} Kuo Mo-jo, for instance, was to write in 1936, ‘Japanese call China “Shina”’. Originally it didn’t have a bad meaning, and they say it comes from the sound Ch’in. But when you hear it from the mouth of Japanese it sounds worse than “Jew” from the mouth of a European.’ Quoted by Sanetō Keishū, \textit{Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi}, 224, who gives a long discussion and apology for the use of the term. Takeuchi Yoshimi, in the pages of \textit{Chūgoku}, 16 (March 1961) 34–6, also warns against the use of ‘Shina’. In 1930 the Nationalist government secured Japanese government agreement to abandon the use of the word in official communications.

\textsuperscript{27} Sanetō Keishū, \textit{Meiji Nisshi bunka Kaisō}, 277–336, for the diary of a young man whose name is known only from the phonetic symbols Sokoman. For Nogi, see 317.
Japanese legal scholar, Hozumi Yatsuka, *Kokumin kyoiku: aikokushin* (The spirit of patriotism in national education), it was promptly translated and issued by the Peking University Press as a textbook. Numerous other Japanese works and biographies dealing with patriotism also quickly found Chinese translations.28

Since the student movement served as a breeding ground for Chinese nationalism, it was natural for student numbers to grow or decline along with political indignation or setbacks. As the figures show, student numbers declined rapidly after 1906, although they remained impressive. Another reason for the decline was an increasing dissatisfaction with the quality of education that many were getting in Tokyo. To some observers this seemed appropriate to the quality of those to be educated; in fact Japanese periodicals began to speculate that superior Chinese students were being sent elsewhere, with only the less qualified coming to Japan. There may have been some grounds for this idea; the United States made its first remission of Boxer funds for the education of Chinese students available in 1908, while Japan did not do the same until 1924. Chinese government surveys and representatives began to express alarm over the disruptive influences inherent in an uncontrolled flood of inadequately prepared students in Japan, and Ch'ing regulations began to prescribe criteria for the selection of students and courses and to discourage short courses. Japanese educational authorities cooperated with these regulations in order to manage their guests. This in turn aroused waves of student indignation against their government and against their Japanese hosts. The quality of schooling probably improved, as the figures of school graduates indicate, but so did the intensity of student organization and disaffection. In 1907 agreements were worked out to open up the best Japanese state higher schools to Chinese students on a regular schedule, and during the next two years over 460 Chinese students were enrolled in them. In June 1911 the Chinese government scheduled the establishment of a preparatory school in Peking to prepare students for the Japanese special higher schools. There was also a rise in the number of Japanese teachers going to China, both to open their own schools and to teach in Chinese schools.29

The misgivings of observers and authorities in Tokyo and Peking grew as students became increasingly self-conscious, emotional and vigilant. Each affront to them served to heighten their nationalism, and also served to inconvenience and usually alarm their hosts and sponsors. In 1902

29 *Ibid.*, 106–7 for the 1907 agreements. For Japanese teachers in China, 96. By late Ch'ing, Japanese teachers there numbered about 600, and even in 1909, long after the tide had ebbed, 311 out of 356 foreign teachers invited by Chinese schools were Japanese. Cost must of course have been a major factor in this.
Chang Ping-lin and others scheduled a rally to honour the last Ming emperor, but it was, at the last minute, ruled out by Japanese authorities. That same year the Chinese minister Ts’ai Chün decided to refuse to provide the guarantees necessary for nine private students to be enrolled at the Seijō preparatory military academy. When a group of students refused to leave the legation until the minister met them, the legation called in Japanese police to arrest them, thereby providing the students with the charge that Chinese authorities were availing themselves of Japanese police assistance in ejecting their own nationals from buildings immune to such interference. Since the students had already heard rumours that Ts’ai Chün had memorialized Peking to warn of revolutionary leanings among their number, their indignation was at white heat. Wu Chih-hui, arrested and deported, tried to commit suicide by leaping into the moat as he was taken past Kajibashi in Tokyo. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao joined the fray by denouncing the minister as an ‘enemy of civilization’ in his journal *Hsin-min ts’ung-pao* (The new people miscellany). Of fourteen Japanese newspapers surveyed by Sanetō all but two, which were neutral, supported the students. After extensive mediation efforts by Japanese official and private quarters a compromise was worked out liberalizing the provisions regarding guarantees for students. At the same time the Chinese legation appointed a new official as student supervisor. Shortly afterwards, the minister was replaced and the nine students entered Seijō.\(^{30}\)

The following year the Chinese government transferred its military students to a newly established preparatory school for the Japanese military academy. It also responded to the urging of the new Chinese minister that ‘Japanese military education stresses loyalty and patriotism and subordination to superiors . . . and contains no dangers of unbridled indiscipline or opposition to government’. It set up regulations under which a hundred students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two would be selected for military education with government sponsorship. At the same time, a University of Tokyo professor, Terao Tōru, sponsored a school to enable privately supported students to follow a military education despite the Peking government’s ban on this kind of school.\(^{31}\)

In 1903 Chinese students organized a successful opposition to the inclusion of Chinese minorities and of Fukienese products in an Osaka Exhibition under the theme of the ‘Races of Man’. Osaka merchants joined in the protest. So far, none of these issues had involved a Chinese–Japanese confrontation. Since the prevailing tide of Japanese sentiment during these years was anti-Russian (Professor Terao, indeed, was one of the ‘seven jingoes’ who agitated vigorously for war), there was even less likelihood

of a confrontation over the next incident, which focused on resistance to Russia in April and May of 1903. This movement was provoked by the Russian refusal to withdraw from Manchuria on schedule, and by Russia’s ‘Seven Demands’ on China, first denied and then admitted by the Russians (in a curious anticipation of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915), as they sought to make permanent their position in Manchuria. Chinese students gathered information from the Japanese press, which was alert to possible encroachments that would be permanently damaging to Japanese interests in Manchuria. The student demonstrations took place without apparent reference to Japanese supporters or incitation, and were in fact ultimately discouraged and stopped by the Japanese government for fear of diplomatic embarrassment. But they were undoubtedly congenial and welcome to Japanese popular opinion. Students organized themselves in the Kanda Student Centre, and formed first a Resist Russia Volunteer Corps and then a student army. Students, in scenes of intense emotionalism, signed announcements of their determination to die, and they commissioned representatives to return to China to urge Governor-general Yuan Shih-k’ai to declare war. Instead, they were advised by his underlings to return to their books. The Chinese government, with British and Japanese encouragement, rejected the Russian demands, and after receiving representations from Peking, the Japanese foreign office warned the students that their activities were becoming a diplomatic embarrassment to Japan. At this point the movement was aborted and changed to an Association for Military Education, which was frankly revolutionary in intent. This series of events was important in the way it marshalled student support from all provinces by using the provincial journals and the central student organization at the Centre. Extremely important student figures, among them Huang Hsing and Ch’en T’ien-hua, also found an opportunity to further nationalist and anti-Manchu agitation.

Hitherto, student activism had been nominally directed against foreign imperialism and slights to Chinese national dignity and sovereignty rather than against the Ch’ing. But it nevertheless showed an increasing tendency to oppose the Peking government. The ties with centres of discontent in Shanghai were close, and alarm spread quickly through China via the journals published by provincial groups in Tokyo. The fiery anti-Manchu pamphlet of Tsou Jung, The revolutionary army, first published in Shanghai

32 For the development of the crisis as seen by the British, and the confidential leaking of the ‘Seven Demands’ by the Chinese Foreign Office to the English representative, see George A. Lensen, ed. Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan 1895–1904: the observations of Sir Ernest Satow, British minister plenipotentiary to Japan (1895–1900) and China (1900–1906), 213–17.

33 For a detailed analysis, Nagai Kazumi, ‘Kyoga gakuseigun o megutte’ (Concerning the student army to resist Russia), Shinshū Daigaku kiyo, 4 (Sept. 1934), 37–83.
in 1903 with a preface by Chang Ping-lin, also appeared concurrently in Hong Kong and Tokyo editions. Feng Tzu-yu credits it with a total of a million copies. A recent analysis lists this work together with three others as the most important pamphlets of the revolutionary period; the others were Chang Ping-lin’s attack on K’ang Yu-wei’s reformism and the two tracts by Ch’en T’ien-hua written immediately after the Resist Russia Movement, Meng hui-t’ou (Wake up!) and Ching-sbih chung (Alarm to arouse the age).

The year 1905 brought the students into confrontation with Japanese educational authorities. In November of that year the Tokyo ministry of education issued a set of regulations entitled ‘Problems in controlling students from the Ch’ing’. Of these, Articles 9 and 10 specified that schools should ensure that their students reside in appropriately authorized dormitories and maintain control over them, and that schools were to monitor student conduct, refuse to admit doubtful cases, and terminate the status of those who violated rules. The regulations represented Chinese as well as Japanese concern, for Chang Chih-tung had become sufficiently alarmed by evidence of student disorder and radicalism to warn that the tide of eight thousand or more students was full of revolutionary danger; ‘Nine out of ten are intimidated,’ he wrote, ‘while the instigators and troublemakers do not number more than one in ten.’ The students quickly protested that the regulations constituted discrimination against them, since they denied to them alone the constitutional freedom enjoyed by Japanese, and they charged that the regulations were political in motivation. Soon the same provincial organizations and publications that had served to pump students into Japan began to pull them out of school in protest. Very large numbers returned home, and several thousand who did not go began a forty-day student strike. Resolution of the issue again included negotiations between the minister to Peking, Uchida Yasuya, and Chang Chih-tung.

While these negotiations were still in progress, the Japanese establishment began to weary of student unrest. On 7 December the Asahi shimbun

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25 Shimada Kenji, Chūgoku kakumei no senkusha tachi (Forerunners of the Chinese revolution), 64. This work includes a Japanese translation of Ch’en’s political novel Shib-tzu-hou (Roar of the Lion), 81–121. Shimada also, in Shingai kakumei no shiso (The thought behind the Revolution of 1911), gives a trans. of Ching-sbih-chung, 83–144. See also Ernest P. Young, ‘Ch’en T’ien-hua (1875–1905): a Chinese nationalist’, in Papers on China, 13 (1959) 113–62. On the latter see also Shimada, Chūgoku kakumei no senkusha tachi, 61–79.
26 Quoted in Nagai Kazumi, ‘Iwayuru Shinkoku ryūgakusei torishimari kisoku jiken no seikaku: Shimatsu ryūgakusei no ichi dōkō’ (The nature of the so-called incident involving Ch’ing regulations for controlling overseas students: a movement among Chinese students in Japan towards the end of the Ch’ing), Shinsū Daigaku kiyō, 2 (July 1912) 31. Sanetū Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi, 461–511, also provides detailed coverage of the struggle.
observed that the strike was caused by the students' misunderstanding of the regulations and their purpose. 'The strike of more than eight thousand Chinese students in schools in all parts of Tokyo has become a great problem,' it began. 'It is based on flimsy grounds, on discontent growing out of an excessively narrow and one-sided interpretation of the Ministry's regulations by the students, and also derives from that self-indulgent and mean self-will that seems peculiar to Chinese nationals.' Ch'en T'ien-hua, who had hitherto taken little part in the strike, spent much of the night composing a testament in which he called upon his fellows never to forget those four characters (self-indulgent and mean); 'If the students are truly self-indulgent and mean, isn't China doomed?' Early the next morning he gave point to his words by committing suicide in the ocean at Ōmori. 'Never forget those four characters,' he had written in his testament, 'always work to make them inapplicable, work to build a country in which they have no place, study for your love of country.' In consequence almost two thousand students returned to China. As the strike deepened, Japanese Diet members and other leaders entered the discussion, and the student movement never regained its earlier elan. Inevitably, the residence requirements were relaxed, and by January 1906 the strike was beginning to wane.

The strike provided the occasion for one of the few large-scale attempts to bring Chinese and Japanese students together. Although numerous personal friendships were formed, the great majority of Chinese students saw little of their Japanese counterparts in any social or informal sense. In January 1906 an effort was launched to form a Sino-Japanese Student Association. An opening meeting drew about 1,500 students, who heard addresses by Count Ōkuma, Viscount Aoki and similar luminaries. Ōkuma once again compared China to the Japan of forty years before, and pointed out the logic of study in Japan for Chinese students. Ma Hsiang-po called upon the Chinese students not to neglect their studies out of love of country, and not to neglect their love of country out of zeal for their studies. Some students gained more meaningful and personal impressions. Lu Hsun said later, in praise of his mentor Professor Fujino, that his consideration in lending him notes and looking over his notebooks was so conspicuous that he was afraid other students would charge him with favouritism. But the more usual notes that emerge from Chinese recollections are a resentment at Japanese condescension and a consciousness of weakness. The weak and the strong, as Kita Ikki noted later, are seldom friends, and it seems clear that the recently weakened and the recently strengthened, in a relationship as complex as that of China and Japan, were not likely to be friends.

37 Sanetō Keishū, Chuukokuin Nihon ryūgaku shi, 492.
The student movement continued to be an important source of stimulation, discontent and activism despite the moderate decrease in student numbers and their gradual restriction to more qualified and serious students. Throughout the last years of the Ch’ing dynasty, provincial and national organizations of Chinese students in Tokyo kept a vigilant eye on real and fancied insults to Chinese sovereignty and dignity. The Japanese were as often at fault in these matters as were other powers, even when they infringed on the dignity of Peking in the interest of revolutionaries presumably more congenial to student tastes. In the steady sequence of railway loans and spheres-of-interest rivalries the students found no lack of issues with which to maintain their political consciousness.

INFLUENCE THROUGH TRANSLATION

The cultural importance of the migration to Japan was very great. As Kuo Mo-jo summarized it in the 1950s, ‘We studied Western culture through Japan . . . . At the same time that the study of Japan broke the feudalistic conventions of the past, it served to further China’s progress toward modernity.’ The student movement was motivated in the first instance by the desire to speed the acquisition of Western knowledge. Early student journals and newspapers had sections reserved for translation. As early as 1896 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was calling China’s translation effort too slow, and urging the use of Japanese translations. Soon Chinese were using Japanese compendia for more than Western knowledge. Indeed, one of the first Japanese works to be translated (in 1899) was a history of East Asia. By 1900 a group of Chinese students in Japan (who included two future prime ministers and two future ministers to Japan) had set up a translating and publishing organization. Within a few years enterprising publishers had put together an encyclopedic shelf of a hundred Japanese texts in translation. Kuo Mo-jo’s recollections of his high-school books in Szechwan included translations from Japanese science texts. The search for the secrets of Japan’s modernization led logically to translations of a good deal of Japanese modern history also, and lists of works translated in the early years of the twentieth century are surprisingly rich in biographical studies of Meiji leaders and political history. They include, also, current Japanese studies of politics, works like Kōtoku Shūsui and Ukita Kazutami on imperialism.

18 See, on a railway issue, Nagai Kazumi, ‘Kō-Setsu roji to Shimmmatsu no minshū’ (The Kiangsu–Chekiang railway and the people in late Ch’ing), Shinshū Daigaku kyo, 11 (1957) 1–25, a study of resistance to the British loan for the Chekiang and Kiangsu railways in 1907–8, a movement which began with Tokyo meetings of students from the areas involved. For the loan negotiations, E-tu Zen Sun, Chinese railways and British interests 1898–1911, 61–8.
19 Quoted in Sanetō Keishū, Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgaku shi, 245.
The turn to Japan was of particular importance because it came at a time when Chinese interests in outside literature were shifting from the purely technological to the institutional and political. With the twentieth century, Professor Tsien has noted, ‘Changing interests were reflected in the translations, as the enthusiasms for natural and applied sciences of the past centuries shifted to the social sciences and humanities. This new emphasis exercised a great influence on the political and social development of China in the following years. From 1902 to 1904, almost half of the translated books were concerned with history and institutions. The interest in institutional reform and Japanese influence were dominant factors in translations during the early years of this century.’ During the period 1880 to 1940 some 2,204 works were translated from Japanese, and of these nearly half were in the social sciences, history and geography. A study of trends in translation shows that in overall influence Japanese translations formed only 15.1 per cent of the total from 1850 to 1889, and 18.2 per cent from 1912 to 1940, but that they came to 60.2 per cent from 1902 to 1904. This proportion very probably held for the remainder of that decade.

The Japanese influence affected translations into Chinese from Western languages in both the selections made and the vocabulary. The infusion of Japanese terminology into Chinese was massive. This held true at all levels. It was evident in popular translations of the romantic political novels of the 1880s like Kajin no kegū (Strange encounters with elegant females), and Keikoku bidan (A noble tale of statesmanship), both translated by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and went beyond these to the entire tide of new knowledge that swept into China. A recent survey estimates that over three-quarters of the new Chinese vocabulary of those decades was Japanese in origin, through Chinese-character compounds that had already become standard in Japanese usage. Japanese influence affected the form as well as the content of books. Modern printing in Japan is sometimes dated from the presses that Hepburn and his Japanese associate Kishida Ginkō procured in Shanghai in the 1860s. A century later Chinese students found new printing techniques in Japan, together with Western-style binding, that they utilized for their periodicals and translations and reimported to China. The student movement thus made its impress on every aspect of the cultural and technological diffusion of knowledge and experience in late Ch'ing and early Republican China.

41 Saneto Keishū, *Chūgokujin Nibon ryūgaku sbi*, 378, for estimates of vocabulary flow. The author sees 1905 as the turning point for use of Western-style bindings in student translations. Part of Kishida's diary of his 1867 trip to Shanghai appears with an introduction in *Chūgoku*, 24 (1965) 5–16.
JAPAN AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARIES

To the intellectual and educational impact there was added a direct personal and political contact between Japan and the Chinese revolutionary movement. It is a contact that has been a good deal more noted in Western and Japanese scholarship than in Chinese studies. Its dimensions are increasingly apparent as a result of the publication of memoirs and source materials.42

There were many reasons for the Japanese and their government to maintain a direct interest in the state of politics in China. The danger of a Manchu collapse and of the partition of China was a constant theme in Japanese writings on national security and international politics after the Sino-Japanese War, and the heightened international competition and rivalry posed problems of affiliation and choice for the Meiji statesmen. It seemed to them that they also had to seize the opportunity to influence the course of events in China. Their natural preference was to do this through advice and assistance to the legitimate government. Proffers of aid through military missions and educational programmes constituted unimpeachable evidence that Japan had overtaken China in the race for modernity, and made real the sense of Japanese leadership in an Asian restoration. On the other hand, Japan had achieved its successes through emulation of and affiliation with the West, and a good many Japanese felt it in their true interests to continue to observe Fukuzawa's advice to be separate from Asia. This concern was maintained through at least the Russo-Japanese War, when a Chinese tie was avoided lest the West conceive of that struggle in racial terms. Thereafter Japan's full involvement in imperialist policies further reduced the urgency and attractions of an Asian stance.

Yet there was also a general opinion that an ultimate confrontation between East and West, yellow and white, was inevitable. This conviction was current in the last decade of the Meiji period, when a good deal of writing in the West about the inevitability of a racial struggle was quickly reported to the Japanese. To the extent that one shared this view, Japan's need to affiliate with China was clear. And, should the Chinese government prove incapable of response or inflexible in its assumptions of superiority, the Japanese would have to think about supporting an alternative regime.

This gloomy view of racial struggle and the fear of Western domination that characterized the entire Meiji period crossed most political positions. Shadings varied and tactics were many, but the root sense of kinship and

commitment to an Asian cause – expressed as ‘common culture, common race’ – was seldom denied. The year 1895 brought a solution for Japan’s primary problems of independence and equality among the great powers, and thereafter it became possible to face the problem of Asia. The practical meaning of this step for Chinese reformers and revolutionaries was determined in good measure by the structure of Japan’s leadership. The principal Meiji leaders, who were entering the status of genrō as the twentieth century began, were on the whole firm in their commitment to the path of affiliation with the West that had worked so well for them. Some of them, especially Yamagata Aritomo, were much concerned about a future clash between the races, but the responsibilities of power usually sufficed to keep their eyes and commitments on the side of the navies and industrial plants of the West. Yamagata’s position overlapped with that of the military specialists, whose leader he was. The army leaders were particularly aware of China’s lack of power to deter the West, and quick to take upon themselves responsibility for continental positions – in Korea, in Liaotung, in ‘South Manchuria’ – from which they could make up for their neighbour’s weakness. Their concern with China’s borders to the north and the Russian armies there made them keen to help train China’s new armies. Individual officers like Fukushima Yasumasa became figures of romance and legend in their courageous individual efforts to reconnoitre the little-known interior of Central Asia.\(^43\)

As against the power elite, there were men who were wary of Western ties, tired of their country’s apparent second-class status in the international order, and articulate advocates of nationality and of Asia. Without the responsibility of power or the direction of national affairs, these Japanese could afford to be contemptuous of caution and diplomacy. As self-appointed guardians of the national conscience with access to communications, they were important heirs of the national reawakening that had followed the advocacy of emperor, nation and cultural nationalism. This category, or spectrum, included the nationalist societies that grew out of the era of party organization in the 1880s – Tōyama Mitsuru’s Genyōsha of 1881 and Uchida Ryōhei’s Kokuryūkai (‘Black Dragon’ or Amur Society) of 1901. As self-appointed advocates of nationalism and morality the nationalist leaders had ready access to men of wealth and power and to youths of courage and conviction. The government, which was working out a new orthodoxy of emperor and state, could neither contradict nor control them. From their ranks came activists in Korea, China and

\(^{43}\) The official history of the Kokuryūkai (Amur or ‘Black Dragon’ Society), Kuzuu Yoshihisa et al. eds., Tōa senkaku sōshi kiden (Stories and biographies of pioneer East Asian idealists), concludes with an extensive biographical honour role of East Asian pioneers.
Manchuria as well as agents of intimidation and propaganda in domestic politics.

Related to though not identified with these organizations were men like Airao Sei (Kiyoshi), who was convinced that Japan’s economic future lay in the development of trading ties with China. Only in Asia, where Japan had the advantages of proximity and familiarity, could she expect to meet the challenge of the West. Well into the late 1890s sentiments of this sort were still minority opinions in a society that had so determinedly gone to school with the West, and this fact contributed to the zeal and sense of moral superiority with which the Asianists called their countrymen back to their proper mission. Arao went to Hankow in 1886 after having distinguished himself in army staff work. He set up an ostensibly mercantile establishment and assigned his men geographic sectors of investigation, thereby collecting information on all parts of China. While his overall thought was of a Japanese hegemony over much of Asia, when it came to China he argued that Japan’s security was directly dependent upon that of her neighbours. Hence it was necessary for Japan to reform and strengthen the Ch’ing empire. 44

The nationalist and Asianist movements intersected with the highest level of the elite in the person of Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904). With his impeccable social credentials, his international experience and early schooling in Germany, and his position as head of the House of Peers, Konoe was in a unique position to speak and act. He made it his mission to sponsor and emphasize the study of Asia and above all of China. He sponsored, subsidized and led the Tōa Dō bun Shoin (lit., ‘East Asian common culture academy’) which was established in 1898. Through its educational centres in China and research centres in Japan it made important contributions to the cultural exchange that was its mission. The year of its founding, 1898, was also the year Ōkuma set forth his ‘Ōkuma Doctrine’. Konoe sensed in the contemporary imperialist seizures in China, and in Japanese public denigration of China’s weakness, a dangerous trend to abandon China and join the West in the imperialist scramble. In a much-quoted article in Taiyō in January 1898 he called for close Sino-Japanese cooperation and association. The root causes of Western aggression were racial, he argued, and Japan had no choice but to oppose them and to assist China to do so. ‘The survival of the Chinese people is by no means a matter of some one else’s welfare,’ he warned, ‘it affects the vital interest of the Japanese themselves.’ Japanese would have to study China, travel to

44 Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Airao Sei (Kiyoshi) (Grand old Airao Sei), provides a biography. See also Akira Iriye, ‘The ideology of Japanese imperialism: imperial Japan and China’, in Grant K. Goodman, ed. Imperial Japan and Asia: a reassessment, 35.
China, and meet Chinese, and only then would they be able to adopt policies appropriate to the danger both countries faced. Just as Konoe’s activities intersected with those of the government in 1898, his efforts joined those of the nationalists in 1901. That date marked the founding both of the Kokuryūkai, an organization dedicated to establishing Japan on the Amur, and of Konoe’s National United League on Russian Policy, the Kokumin Tairo Dōshikai.

Farther from power and influence, but still on the fringes of the power elite, were the Meiji liberals associated with the movement for peoples’ rights (Jiyū minken undō). Many of them saw their struggle for political liberalism in Japan as related to those of other Asian peoples. Most of them, despite their use of Western liberal and constitutional thought, were vigorously ‘Asian’ in their resistance to the Western thrust. Early Jiyūtō (Liberal party) writers and editorialists were keenly aware of conditions in Korea, and wanted to sponsor liberalism there as well as in Japan. Ōi Kentarō developed a bizarre filibustering expedition to Korea for the sake of liberty in 1885, and during the same period Tarui Tōkichi, a founder of the East Asian Socialist Party (Tō Shakaitō) which was quickly banned by the Japanese police, wrote a tract (Daitō gappō ron) calling for the union of Japan and Korea in a state to be known as Great East (Daitō). For him, as for others, the war of the races was nearing so rapidly that there was no time for half-way measures. Asian solidarity had to be established. These schemes contained idealism and commitment as well as parochialism and arrogance, and they appealed to the best in Meiji universalism as well as the worst in Meiji particularism and chauvinism. Similarly, liberal theorists like Nakae Chōmin argued for associating the reform of China with that of Japan, and as early as 1881 Ueki Emori had organized a Rise Asia (Kōa) Society. Even after the mainstream of the movement for parliamentary liberalism drew closer to the Meiji government with the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889, it was logical for its more radical wing, the twentieth-century socialists and anarchists, to maintain the Asian consciousness of their predecessors through a warm interest in China and the Chinese.

The most striking examples of personal cooperation with Chinese revolutionaries were provided by Japanese of the liberal left. Miyazaki Tōten was acclaimed by Sun Yat-sen as ‘a chivalrous hero. His insight is extensive, his ideals are out of the ordinary; he is one who hastens to

45 A convenient and authoritative summary of the history and the contributions of the Tōa Dōbunkai and Tōa Dōbun Shoin can be found in Chūōkō, 21 (Aug. 1965) 7–22.
46 Some of these matters are discussed in Jansen, ‘Japanese views of China’, 163–89. For Miyazaki’s complete works see Miyazaki Ryūsuke and Onogawa Hidemi, eds. Miyazaki Tōten zenshū.
help another's need, his heart warm with benevolence and righteousness. He always laments the deterioration that has befallen the yellow race, and grieves because of China's increasing weakness.' Miyazaki and his brothers came out of the early liberal movement, experimented with Christianity, drank in the single-tax solution of Henry George, and devoted their lives to the service of the Chinese revolutionary cause.47

Because these themes of crisis, commitment and conscience were so basic to the Meiji scene, it is not surprising that men who devoted their lives to what their countrymen saw as high ideals, could find rapport at many points within the structure of the groups which have been sketched above. Some important contacts came by fortunate coincidence. For example, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Inukai Ki, leaders of the political party movement, were in office at a time when the crisis of imperialist advance in China triggered the reform movement of 1898. The launching of the life work of Miyazaki Tōten, the introduction of Sun Yat-sen to important Japanese supporters, the Hundred Days in Peking, the Kenseitō cabinet of Ōkuma and Itagaki, the founding of the Dōbunkai, the flight of Chinese reformers to Japan, and the beginnings of the student movement, all came in quick succession.

It has already been noted that the Chinese reformers, who were a natural elite among the political refugees, received the care and hospitality of high-ranking Japanese. Support for the escape of K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao to Japan was arranged at the highest levels of the Tokyo government. Intermediary for much of this, and privy to all of it, was the Dōbunkai head, Prince Konoe. K’ang met leading Japanese, enjoyed the hospitality of Count Ōkuma, and had a long talk with Konoe himself in which the latter contrasted for him the long preparation of the Meiji Restoration with the seemingly precipitate course of the Hundred Days. As always, Konoe emphasized his sense of common cultural and political concerns with China, and the need for an Asian Monroe Doctrine. It was the feeling of Konoe’s group that K’ang was too prominent to be encouraged to stay in Japan for very long, however, and in the spring of 1899 secret foreign office funds were made available (via Konoe) for K’ang’s departure for Vancouver, Canada. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao also met with Konoe and other highly placed Japanese. In 1899 Konoe himself travelled to China. There he had long talks with reform-minded officials. Chang Chih-tung remonstrated with him on the subject of Japanese sanctuary for K’ang and Liang, and the possible harm the latter’s writing could do to Chinese students in Japan. Konoe deprecated the appeal and importance of the reformers, and preferred to turn to his favourite subjects of Sino-

47 From Sun Yat-sen’s foreword to Miyazaki’s Sanjū-san-nen no yume (Thirty-three years’ dream).
Japanese cooperation and common concerns. A little earlier in Hong Kong, Konoe had met Miyazaki and Hirayama Shū, both the recipients of government funds, in order to acquaint himself with political currents in South China. 

Activist liberals like Miyazaki and Hirayama found their natural friends among the Chinese revolutionaries and not among Chinese reformers or Japanese peers. In 1900 Miyazaki's efforts to get K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen to cooperate drew so much suspicion from K'ang that it ended in his arrest by the Singapore authorities, while Konoe, noting the stories of this in his diary, dismissed his countryman as a 'plotter'. Ties with the student movement also took time to develop. During the early years, when students were still carefully sponsored and academically oriented, Sun Yat-sen and his Japanese friends received relatively little support from Chinese students in Japan. But then as the number, variety and political intensity of students grew, revolutionary sentiments gained ground. At the same time, Japanese nationalism, turned as it was against Russia, did not immediately offend. Consequently the Chinese revolutionaries found the ground better prepared for their efforts among Japanese as well as among Chinese students.

Sun Yat-sen had fled to Japan after the failure of his first attempt at revolt in Canton in 1895. In Yokahama he cut his queue, grew a moustache and adopted Western clothes of Japanese cut. 'After the Japanese war,' he later recalled, 'when the natives of Japan began to be treated with more respect, I had no trouble, when I let hair and moustache grow, in passing for a Japanese.' From Japan he went to London where his detention and near extradition by the Chinese embassy, which he described in his widely read *Kidnapped in London*, made him famous. He returned to Japan in August 1897. He now made the acquaintance of Miyazaki and Hirayama. They had heard of his return to Japan from Sun's associates in China, where they had gone to investigate politics at the request of Inukai Ki. Sun very quickly established a magnetic influence over his new friends. Although they reported to Inukai, and indeed introduced Sun Yat-sen to him, their loyalty was to Sun and to the vision of a resurgent Asia they shared with him.

Their first cooperative project was a plan to aid the Filipino revolution of Aguinaldo, through the purchase and shipment of arms and the transport of a small group of adventurers. The project foundered, as did the over-age and overloaded ship on which the guns were sent, taking the lives...
of several Japanese adventurers. In a second project, the Japanese tried to get Chinese revolutionaries and reformers together after the disastrous failure of the Hundred Days. This too came to nothing. Although reformers and revolutionaries were alike dependent upon Japanese sanctuary and in touch with the same Japanese – Miyazaki had met K’ang Yu-wei in Hong Kong and Hirayama had accompanied Liang Ch’i-ch’ao to Yokohama – the Chinese reformers had little confidence in the revolutionaries, whom they considered their cultural and social inferiors. Early schools that were established with the help of Inukai and Konoe quickly came under the control of reformers rather than revolutionaries. Meanwhile the adventurer-liberals among the Japanese gravitated towards the activist revolutionaries rather than towards the reformers. In 1900, the abortive revolt led by T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang at Hankow had the nominal support of Chinese of both factions, but thereafter the divisions among Chinese anxious for change were permanent.49

In the late summer of 1900 Sun Yat-sen tried to stage a revolution in Kwangtung, placing the greatest reliance upon Japanese participation. The revolt was based upon the now Japanese island of Taiwan, and to some extent related to the expectation that Japan would take advantage of the Boxer disturbances in North China to move into South China. Amoy was, in fact, occupied for a time by Japanese troops in response to a staged anti-Japanese ‘provocation’. Sun Yat-sen drew up a provisional government that had several Japanese in posts of responsibility. One of his associates rounded up secret-society members in Kwangtung, and began to lead them in the direction of Amoy to meet the hoped-for supplies of men and weapons from Japan. In initial engagements the rebels were everywhere victorious. But two weeks after the rising had begun Sun Yat-sen, realizing Japanese aid would not after all be forthcoming, sent word to abandon the attempt. Yamada Yoshimasa, a Japanese who carried this final message, fell into the hands of Manchu troops who killed him. As Sun wrote on his epitaph, ‘he came forward and went to his death in battle for the cause of righteousness. Truly he sacrificed himself for humanity and became a pioneer of the new Asia’.50

After the failure of this revolt in 1900, Sun Yat-sen experimented unsuccessfully with sources of support from Indo-China, which the French


50 Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 82-104. It was the failure of the Waichow (or Hui-chou) revolt that brought Miyazaki to write his Thirty-three Years’ Dream.
governor-general invited him to visit in 1903, and from the United States, where he tried to sway the Triad Society leaders. These failures, added to his earlier disillusionment with the lack of discipline and dependability among the secret-society members of South China who had provided the bulk of his earlier following, convinced him that he should recruit from among the Chinese students in Japan, and particularly from those in military schools. The dramatic growth of the student movement came during the years of Sun’s wanderings in Indo-China and the United States. The rising tide of Japanese feeling against Russia was also important. Kokuryūkai members saw their nationalism related to Asian opportunities, and believed that, with the fall of the Ch’ing, Chinese control of Manchuria would lose its rationale. Consequently, as the official history of the organization put it, ‘love of country and chivalry went hand in hand in the Japanese help of the South China revolutions’. Meanwhile, the student volunteer army organized against Russia in 1903 produced additional recruits for the revolution. Huang Hsing, for example, returned to Hunan to attempt an insurrection. He began as an instructor in a Japanese language school, but in addition printed and distributed the revolutionary pamphlets of Ch’en T’ien-hua. Virtually every member active in the early stage of the revolutionary organization, the Hua-hsing hui, which he founded, had been or would become a student in Japan. Before the organization staged the insurrection that was planned for 1904, however, the Ch’ing authorities raided Huang’s home and his Japanese school, and the principals barely made the dangerous and difficult trip back to Japan. In Tokyo Huang was soon contacted by some of the same Japanese who had assisted Sun Yat-sen. Like Sun, he accepted the argumentation of ‘common culture and common race’, and with his associate Sung Chiao-jen he provided an additional focus for Japanese encouragement and assistance.

Sun Yat-sen returned to Tokyo when the student tide was at full flood in the late summer of 1905. His revolutionary programmes and slogans had now been worked out. What was lacking was a new organization, and this he built in cooperation with Huang Hsing, to whom his Japanese friends provided the introduction. After a series of planning meetings the T’ung-meng hui was formed on 30 July 1905, at the home of Uchida Ryohei, the Kokuryūkai head. Some seventy persons were present, virtually all of them

51 Quoted in Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 111. For Sun’s contact with students and his secret society ties, see Cheng, ‘The T'ung-meng-hui’, 36. See also Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the origins of the Chinese Revolution, 30ff.

52 Sung, however, never fully accepted the Japanese arguments. Noriko Tamada, ‘Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution’, Papers on China, 21 (1968) 189. For Huang, the fullest source is Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. The fullest treatment of Sung is that of Liew, Struggle for democracy.
Chinese students, representing seventeen of the eighteen provinces. The formal inaugural meeting was 20 August, this time at the residence of Sakamoto Kinya. Three Japanese – Miyazaki Tōten, Hirayama Shū and Kayano Chōchi – were full members, and Miyazaki was given powers of attorney in 1907 to negotiate for arms and supplies as Japanese representative of the organization. The T’ung-meng hui (Revolutionary Alliance or League) built upon the provincial organizations the students had formed in Tokyo; it added to these some of the techniques of oaths and secrecy of the traditional secret societies, and it did so in the name of the Three Principles that Sun Yat-sen had worked out through his reading in the West, together with Five Slogans, one of which called for Sino-Japanese friendship. The T’ung-meng hui thus represented in unique degree the visible product of China’s search for nationalism and modernization through education in Japan.

The intellectual content of the League’s propaganda and its political struggle with the reform persuasion represented by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, are treated elsewhere (see chapter 9). Its leaders sometimes had a difficult task defending themselves against revolutionaries less persuaded of the benign course of Japanese opinion. Hu Han-min, writing in Min pao, found himself explaining and apologizing for some of the condescension and arrogance implicit in the ‘favour’ of Count Ōkuma and the more explicit disfavour of the Tokyo government. Even these explanations proved inadequate after 1907, when the Japanese government chose to align itself formally with the imperialist powers in a series of agreements to arrange Asian boundaries and decided to ask Sun Yat-sen to leave Japan. His departure, like that of K’ang Yu-wei eight years earlier, was eased by secret foreign office money to ward off an open break or the wrath of his Japanese nationalist friends, but it deprived the revolutionaries of the use of their Tokyo base and gradually shifted the centre of T’ung-meng hui activities to other points on the fringe of China. In Sun’s absence the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the provincial origins and intellectual diversity of the organization weakened its unity and vitality. But the more important trends inherent in the steady accretion of education, nationalism and discontent among young Chinese went on as before, to the ultimate benefit, though not the direct credit, of the revolutionary movement.

Direct Japanese influence declined as the revolution neared. Miyazaki, Kayano and other agents of the revolutionary party became the objects of government surveillance and distrust. So did their Chinese friends on their

53 Shimada Kenji, Shingai kakumei no sōshi, 193–4, discusses several speeches in which Ōkuma adopted a very hard line on China’s need to take Japanese advice, and Hu Han-min’s attempt, in Min-pao, to distinguish between the Japanese government and Japanese people.
secret visits to Japan. The image of a friendly Japanese government gradually changed to that of a particularly dangerous imperialist power, the more feared for its proximity and ease of access. The outbreak of revolution in 1911 found Sun Yat-sen travelling from America, not to China or to Japan, but to England in hopes of deterring a threatened Japanese intervention, while the Tokyo government itself was so unsure of its course that it succeeded in alienating almost all candidates for power in China. In Manchuria, Japanese army-backed adventurers launched their first attempt to set up a separate pro-Japanese buffer state. Elsewhere Sun Yat-sen’s old friends were active but unable to deliver or guarantee the support of their countrymen. Kita Ikki, a socialist and nationalist, was close to Sung Chiao-jen, but he also managed to send daily cables to Uchida Ryōhei, the Kokuryūkai head, reporting on the political confusion. He later retired to write a thoughtful explanation of why Japanese bourgeois-imperialist society had failed in its great opportunity to establish a position of leadership and trust with a Chinese republic struggling to be born. Others, including Miyazaki and Kayano, were so close to Sun Yat-sen that they shared in his speedy eclipse after the failure of the revolutionary government. He himself, thrown back upon the hospitality of Japan after his brief moment of success, proved more willing to make promises with regard to Japanese interests in Manchuria than he had before.54

The Japanese also played a role in the longer and deeper intellectual revolution in modern China. As the Japanese government alternated between the repressive and imperialist emphases of Prime Minister Katsura (1901–6; 1908–11) and the milder interludes under Saionji (1906–8; 1911–12), intellectuals of the socialist left found an occasional opportunity to express their disenchantment with parliamentarianism in speech and publication. Miyazaki Tamizo, brother of Toten, was a firm advocate of Henry George’s single-tax theory, and published two articles in the revolutionary journal Min pao. There is no reason to doubt that such views and contacts contributed to Sun Yat-sen’s views on the land problem.55

A more direct influence can be traced in the currents of anarchism. Works on Russian nihilism had been published in Japan as early as the 1880s, and Japanese radicals later related the founding of their ephemeral East Asian Socialist Party in 1882 to these works. After 1902 a growing interest in anarchism developed in Japan. A Waseda professor wrote an

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influential work about the Russian revolutionary movement which emphasized a three-stage periodization of revolutionary literature, propaganda and agitation, and assassination and terror. This had influence among Chinese revolutionaries. The Russo-Japanese War further increased Japanese interest in Russia, and popular novelists like Futabatei Shimei and popular heroes of the war-like Hirose Takeo were deeply influenced by Russian values and culture. The term and concept of anarchism entered Chinese language and thought through Japanese translations in 1903. During the same years the individual heroics of Russian revolutionaries began to seem unusually appropriate models of emulation to Chinese students. The emotionalism of the decade, shown in the isolated patriotic suicides, the students’ consciousness of themselves as a vanguard, and their disgust with the tyranny of their government, all made the Russian case seem relevant.

After the brief Revolution of 1905, a number of Russian refugees and revolutionaries made their way to Nagasaki. Sun Yat-sen on his way to Annam met them through introductions by the Kokuryūkai and Kayano. The Miyazaki-Kayano group worked with the Russians to publish a magazine called Kakumei hyōron (Revolutionary review) which was intended to speed both the Chinese and Russian revolutions. Though it was soon stopped by the Japanese police, the journal was produced in a climate of vigorous left-wing publication in Japan. Hikari (The light), Heimin shimbun (Commoners’ press), Chokugen (Straight talk) and others indicated by their titles the current of social criticism. All this coincided with a major turn within the Japanese socialist movement as Kōtoku Shūsui made known his shift to anarchism in 1906. For a time Min pao and Kakumei hyōron borrowed from and advertised each other. Min pao came increasingly into the hands of men like Chang Ping-lin and Chang Chi, who had an interest in anarchism, even before Sun’s expulsion from Japan. These men were by no means pro-Japanese (Chang Ping-lin, indeed, tended to be highly critical of Japanese culture and aspirations), nor were they pro-Western. But they were like their Japanese counterparts in the general tide of radical intellectuals. Their denunciations of the evils of capitalist society and institutions and of the West, and their moral strictures and judgments, though expressed in terms of anarchist radicalism, owed much to the philosophical currents hostile to bourgeois materialism in their own tradition.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the larger question of the impact of Japan on modern Chinese liberal and revolutionary thought.\(^{56}\)

The Chinese increasingly drew directly from Western sources in their ideological borrowing, and the specifically Japanese element that inhered in translations from the Japanese would be difficult to define. Yet it is clear that the streams of radical thought in the two countries cannot be considered in isolation. For members of the Chinese student generation in Japan the Japanese radicals were personal friends and moral giants. The diary of Ching Mei-chiu makes clear how significant it was for one important Chinese student to hear speakers like Kōtoku Shūsui and Ōsugi Sakae. Japanese radicalism played a large part in the Chinese environment in Tokyo.57

The Japanese influence was not of course decisive, but supplemented and reinforced the larger trends of change which the Chinese experienced. Nor, indeed, were the revolutionaries themselves decisive figures in making the first revolution; in the words of Mary Wright, 'they created a tradition rather than a revolution'.58 It is difficult to measure the impact of Japanese contacts on the Chinese leaders personally. But it is often easy to recognize in that contact the most important experience in the lives of certain Japanese. The 'China ronin', as Miyazaki and his friends were called, were known as such throughout their lives. For them the struggle to build a new East Asia was a cause that transcended personal or national boundaries. On both sides, however, the experience of internationalism proved difficult to accommodate in the rising tides of nationalist consciousness.59


57 For meetings and contacts, see the reminiscences of Takeuchi Zensaku, ‘Meiji makki ni okeru Chū-Nichi kakumei undo no koryū’ (Interflow in the Chinese and Japanese revolutionary movements in late Meiji years), Chūgoku kenkyū, 5 (Sept. 1948) 74–93. However, it will also be seen from R. A. Scalapino and H. Schiffrin, ‘Early socialist currents in the Chinese revolutionary movement: Sun Yat-sen versus Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’, JAS, 18.3 (May 1959) 321–42, that the examples and arguments chosen are uniformly those from the West.
58 Introduction, CIR, 43.
59 A residence of Huang Hsing’s in Tokyo became the headquarters of the post World War I student organization, the Shinjinkai, of which Miyazaki Tōten’s son was a founding member. See Henry D. Smith, II, Japan’s first student radicals, 39.